2026 Various and sundry (2)

Introduction

This is my “various and sundry” page for 2026, March–?. It was preceded by 2026 (1).

For more information on the purpose of these pages, reading order, update policy, notes on terminology, etc., see the category description.

As a special terminology note for this page, I stress that phrasings involving “Iran” should usually be seen as referring the Islamist regime, the Iranian government, the Iranian military, or whatever fits best in the context at hand—not Iran as a country, more generally, or the Iranian people. (The same, m.m., applies to other pages and other countries too, but is of unusual importance on this page, due to the attacks against Iran [sic!] beginning on 2026-02-28.)

For the other pages, see the category navigation.

The entries

Temporary hiatus (2026-04-01)

I have decided to take hiatus from this page and, partly, politics during April. New entries will either not be made or be exceptional until May begins.

(The date is an unfortunate coincidence. No joke is intended.)

The Left and demonstrations (2026-03-29)

As a point of some relevance to e.g. the “No Kings” nonsense, cf. the previous entry and others, we have a recurring issue of the Left not using factual arguments but preferring to make noise and be visible, which can give a misleading impression of who is or is not dissatisfied, who has what opinions, etc., because the non-Left is less likely to engage in such childish antics. (As I noted in some older text, much of Leftism consists in standing on a rooftop and shouting in a megaphone that “We are the good guys! They are they bad guys!”.) This the more so, when, as often appears to be the case, the protests are highly organized and given financing from nefarious far-Left organizations or actors. (Likewise, but off topic, the Left is far more likely to engage in sloganeering over use of factual arguments, use soundbites, whatnot.)

German/Swedish “No Kings” reporting (2026-03-29)

In the wake of yet another idiotic “No Kings” protest (where were these morons when the Biden regime ran roughshod over democracy and civil rights?), both Swedish and German news sources appear to continue the trend of simplistic and/or pro-Left reporting that does so much harm to the international understanding of matters—I note e.g. how my own views of Obama (outside, of course, the disastrous, and predictably disastrous, ObamaCare) was unduly positive as late as around 2016, because I had relied too much on the German/Swedish reporting and looked too much at foreign policy and too little at U.S. domestic policy. (That foreign policy matters dominate in the reporting in other countries is very natural, but often very unfortunate when someone wishes to gain a deeper understanding.)

Notably, problems like violence by demonstrators have gone unmentioned or, cf. below, received misleading and/or alibi mentions, no focus has been given on these demonstrations as partisan Leftist or far Leftist affairs (as opposed to a true popular protest), not one word has been given to contrast Trump with Biden and his (again) truly anti-democratic take, etc.

Instead, we have headlines that point to the large scale of the protests, as with “No Kings: Millionen Menschen demonstrieren wieder gegen Trump - Kundgebungen auch in Deutschland”^e ([1]; internal quotation marks removed): “No Kings: Millions of people demonstrate against Trump again - rallies in Germany too”

The contents appear no better, in particular with no criticism of the protesters. Instead, we see uncritical repetition of absurd claims by the protesters like “Wir verlieren unsere Demokratie” (“We are losing our democracy”) and “Kampf dem Faschismus” (“Fight Fascism”), while Biden and the Democrats were/are the threats to democracy and have shown that “Fascist is as Fascist does”, and while Trump’s election victory was the thin barrier between a surviving democracy (which the U.S. still has) and a non-democracy (which would have been the likely effect of a Harris victory; ditto, a Biden II, had he not bowed out). Now, such claims are given as quotes and do, therefore, not necessarily represent the views of the reporters—but there is no true space given to counter statements. The lack of critical approach could conceivably be defended on a “neutral reporting basis”, but not when the messages of the one party are given and those of the other not.

Great emphasis is put on the size on the protests, including claiming 8 million in total, thousands in Atlanta, Georgia, and tens of thousands in New York. Ditto on famous-but-politically-ignorant persons involved, viz. Robert De Niro and Bruce Springsteen. (The details, of course, can vary from text to text. The current claims refer to [1].)

In contrast, a brief mention is made about violence, that a federal building had been surrounded and two (2!) persons had been apprehended. This while U.S. sources speak of violent clashes, attacks on the building (or buildings plural, I am not quite up to date), dozens of arrests, and more than a thousand involved protesters, which gives a very different impression. (Notably, two arrests, whether true or false, would be consistent with, say, half a dozen protesters. Indeed, if the portraits of law enforcement common in today’s world held true, or, indeed, if Trump actually ran a Fascist regime, it would be compatible with half a dozen peace-loving hippies singing Kumbaya.)

Renee Good and Alex Pretti find mention in the shape that Springsteen had written a song about them and that they had been shot to death—but no word on the circumstances, that they had severely provoked the situations and caused the events through their own actions.

Chilling effects outside speech (2026-03-26)

An issue implicit in the previous entry is that of “chilling effects” (indeed, the current entry originated as a side-note to that entry).

Chilling effects are almost proverbially associated with speech, including the oft repeated phrase (and trivial variations thereof) that this-or-that “will have a chilling effect on free speech”—and the U.S. Democrats and other Leftist groups have a long history of chilling speech. However, chilling effects can be much wider.

For instance, looking at the previous entry, we might have issues (likely, with a deliberate Democrat or other Leftist intent) like prospective ICE agents foregoing the option out of fear of having worse future employment opportunities in law enforcement (maybe, at all) or of being prosecuted for having done their jobs—even when in full accordance with the law, ethics, common sense, whatnot. (Unlike various Nazi officials, with whom the Left has repeatedly tried to create a false equivalency.) Likewise, a lawyer who sees that others have suffered repercussions for defending Trump or one of his allies in court might refuse to follow in their footsteps, thereby increasing the chances that political per-/prosecution by the Left will be successful. Likewise, someone who sees others prosecuted for having joined the Trump administration might refrain from seeking office or refuse an offer of one. Etc.

Indeed, similar chilling effects have a long history, including in law enforcement. For instance, Heather Mac Donald’s “Are Cops Racist?” mentions problems like cops being more lenient with Blacks (much contrary to Leftist propaganda and to the detriment of the law-abiding of any color) out of fear that they would get into trouble if they are not—in a book published in 2003 and going back in time. (The book, in general, is a good example of “nothing new under the sun”, with an eye at many problems that are current today and were current not only when she wrote about them but, often, long before then.) For instance, the hate rhetoric directed at authors and debaters like Heather Mac Donald is it self a good example of a speech-related chilling effect, as a great many others might have refrained from addressing certain topics and/or altered the way that they addressed these topics to avoid falling victim to similar hate rhetoric.

Exactly where to draw the border between a chilling effect and something else is a tricky question, but I note that a phrase used with an overlapping intent, pour encourager les autres^e, appears to go back to 1759 (Voltaire, “Candide”) and that similar ideas are much older even than that—note e.g. encouraging and discouraging stories in the Bible and Greek mythology. The deterring intent of various punishments in ancient (and modern) law systems obviously also follows a similar idea, but one where we might be too strongly in “something else” territory.

Leftist hypocrisy, abuse of the legal system, and Project 2029 (2026-03-26)

Leftist abuse of the legal system is a long-standing problem, as with the extensive recent and current attempts at lawfare, including against Trump and various of his allies based on (no pun intended) trumped up charges, loose allegations, fear mongering, the presupposition that someone invariably will commit a crime in the future, acts by Republicans than have gone without prosecution when performed by Democrats, etc. (Note e.g. the now-proved-as-a-hoax allegations of Russian election interference; how Trump was deemed a criminal for questioning election results; and the extreme double standard in the handling of the J6 victims and some pro-lifers, on the one hand, and various Antifa terrorists and rioters/occupiers/batters/whatnots from the BLM movement, on the other.)

Apparently, far-Left governor Pritzker and a “Project 2029” are already preparing for a massive renewal of such efforts, should the Democrats regain power in 2029. Worse, they are using this as an argument to vote for the anti-democratic Democrats...

A particular perfidy is the claim that this is to restore the rule of law, where we have to consider issues like: (a) The massive problems with Democrat and Leftist crimes, be it by breaking or setting aside actual laws or in a more metaphorical “crimes against X” sense (where “X” can signify e.g. “humanity”, “civil rights”, “language”), be it welfare fraud, political riots, the trampling of civil rights during the COVID-countermeasure era, or, indeed, the aforementioned abuse of the justice system. (b) A massive Democrat failure to uphold the law in favor of groups that are, well, favored, like illegal immigrants, Black criminals, and, of course, those who are publicly anti-Trump.

This “Project 2029” agenda also repeats a recurring problem of pushing prosecution of vaguely described crimes—with the implication that there are crimes to prosecute. Also note earlier clamors against ICE, be it through vague allegations of criminality or claims that ICE agents would be out to murder innocent citizens, be it with threats of prosecution for having worked with ICE or threats that former ICE agents will never be allowed to work in law enforcement; and, in a similar family, the call that the military should refuse unlawful orders by Trump et al. (The military already has a duty to refuse unlawful orders, making the calls either pointless or requiring that some specific unlawful order is present—and that, in all likelihood, is the point, that the impression be created that there are unlawful orders, without having to go through pesky steps of proofs and legal evaluations.) But if crimes actually are committed, there is little that prevents current steps. File legal charges now, present proof and legal arguments, and demand current prosecution. If sufficient proof and arguments exist, then prosecution will either take place (no need to wait) or be suppressed (in which case this can be documented and used further down the line). The fact that the Democrats do not take action now is a strong sign that proof and legal arguments are missing—and the fact that threats are made for “once we are back in power” are a strong sign that a deliberate further abuse of the justice system through exercising that power in violation of due process, the presumption of innocence, etc., is explicitly planned.

Even calls to e.g. “restore the rule of law” show a similar problem, because they imply that the rule of law needs to be restored. (While the facts of the matter is that rule of law suffered badly under Biden, and still does under e.g. Newsom, while Trump is the one actually trying to restore it—and that it is often his attempts to restore it, e.g. through enforcement of immigration law, that is met with protests from the Left.)

Indeed, what we actually see appears to be a continuation of persecution based on opinion—that having an opinion that is not sufficiently conformant with a Leftist orthodoxy is viewed as criminal in its own right. Ditto, based on attempts to (entirely legally and entirely within a democratic framework) implement policies of which the Left disapproves. Ditto, working with someone who implements such policies. Etc.

“The Verdict”, the greater good, etc. (2026-03-26)

I have just watched “The Verdict”, a very thought-worthy film.

The core motivation behind this entry is the thought how a too Utilitarian or “greater good” approach can have absurd consequences.

The premise of the film is that a young woman has suffered severe brain damage (as the phrase goes, turning her into a vegetable) and that her sister is now suing two physicians and, important here, the Catholic hospital and/or the diocese behind it. As it turns out, this is not just a case of malpractice but of falsification of evidence and testimony to cover up the malpractice.

My immediate reaction to this setup was that a success for the plaintiffs would, in the short term, risk doing more harm than good—and that many Leftists, Utilitarians, extreme pragmatists, whatnot, might see it as for the best if the defendants won. After all, if the plaintiffs won, this could imply a worsening of medical services through a money deficit. (Or, if the diocese or the Catholic Church, more generally, stepped in to cover the deficit for the hospital, potentially less money to be put to other charitable purposes. The Catholic Church might be more likely than a commercial enterprise to cut into, say, the remuneration of its leadership and leaving charity constant, but I would not be too optimistic.) Indeed, with costs for lawyers, expert witnesses, and whatnots, this might apply just by a suit going to trial (even should the defendants win) or, even, being brought (even should a trial be averted, with or without a settlement). In a next step, it might seem natural to e.g. grant hospitals (or specifically some sub-set of hospitals) immunity against tort suits, because the gains for any plaintiffs might go at the cost of the rest of society. Ditto e.g. various government institutions and whatnots.

Such an approach has a justification in that “fiat justitia ruat caelum” could have too dire consequences or that specifically government institutions work with “someone else’s money”, implying that it is ultimately the citizens who pay for the government’s screw-ups. However, if so, the better approach would be too limit the consequences to a conscionable level, say, by having suits go forth and limit any awarded damages to some tolerable limit. (Whether this is also a good and/or the best approach, I leave unstated.) Benefits include greater incentives to stick to the law, to do a good job, or whatever applies in the case at hand. In particular, if someone no longer has to take responsibility for his actions and their consequences, the results could be (and very often are) highly problematic—and the more so, when an institution, governmental or otherwise, is concerned. (In part, because these usually can do more damage even out of negligence than can an individual human; in part, because they appear to be unusually prone to similar problems, even absent a formal legal protection.)

Indeed, taking a long-term perspective, fully considering the game-theoretical aspects of such issues, it might be for the best to not have any limits at all or to only have limits that apply similarly to any other actor. (For instance, if punitive damages are awarded, it is reasonable to measure them against what the actor can reasonably pay—but hospitals and private individuals should not be given different treatments. Ditto charitable and commercial hospitals, etc.)

A few other points:

1. One of the lawyers in the film (with great justification) raises the question whether the memory of a witness can be viewed as reliable after four years (the time between the medical malpractice and the trial). This while, in real life, many accused (especially, when alleged acts of a sexual nature are involved) face accusations or trials decades after the alleged events. (Cf. a recent entry.)

2. Looking at the culpability of the defendants, we might (cf. side-note) have had a legitimate “mitigating circumstance” (overwork), followed by a negligent-but-honest mistake, followed by malicious manipulation and cover-up to avoid repercussions. While it was the mistake that brought the horrifying consequences to the patient, the malicious manipulation and cover-up might be ethically worse and/or more worthy of punishment. (While tort damages, as recompense to the plaintiffs should still be governed by the medical results and the defendants culpability in this regard.)

   Almost certainly, it would have been the best for all parties, had the physician come clear at the time of the events—and it would certainly have been far more ethical. (The “best” looking at actual outcomes, trial included. In an alternate reality where the deceit was successful in the long term, outcomes would have been more mixed. The “[a]lmost” arises through issues like how the plaintiffs weigh years of waiting against a, presumably, larger amount of money in damages than in a more upfront settlement following shortly after the medical malpractice.)

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   Side-note:

   I say “might”, because the reason for the overwork was not (to my recollection) given. A statement was given to the effect that the physician had performed multiple consecutive deliveries and, as a consequence, had failed to look at a medical chart with crucial information—specifically, that the patient had eaten recently and, by implication, needed a different type of anaesthetic to prevent exactly what did happen, namely, that she threw up in her breathing mask, which brought disastrous complications. (With reservations for the exact details.)

   In a next step, we have to raise the question why these consecutive deliveries had been performed by one physician. It might e.g. be that there were mothers-to-be in dire need of a physician and no-one else available; it might e.g. be that he took jobs that someone else could have done in order to increase his earnings. (The former seems more likely, given the overall context, but I cannot rule the other explanation out, for want of more detailed knowledge, and I cannot rule out that some other explanation yet was the true reason.) Depending on what applies, culpability for the ensuing malpractice might look very differently.

   To boot, it is possible that such culpability affects the physician and the hospital differently, e.g. in that the physician saw himself forced to work without rest in light of a patient-load created by the hospital, giving him some excuse while leaving the hospital on the hook. (Vice versa, it might be that the physician is ultimately fully culpable for the malicious manipulation while the hospital only is so on “the buck stops here” basis or through failing in hiring or supervisory practices. Such complications raise secondary questions about when different parties should or should not face the same verdict or, in a criminal case, be prosecuted together, and similar.)

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3. Consent (especially, informed consent) is usually viewed as a matter for medicine, but the film gives a good illustration of how important it can be more generally—something that I have mentioned repeatedly in the past: The protagonist, the lawyer for the plaintiffs, has an offer for a reasonably generous settlement—certain money in the hand. He turns it down in favor of a trial without consulting with the plaintiffs, who are unhappy about this (the husband is outright furious). To this, note that the decision might have been the single most important of their lives, as the amount at hand was quite large. (To my recollection, 210.000 in 1980 USD—and far more in 2026 USD.)

4. Overlapping with the previous item, we have issues like when and whether lawyer and client (more generally, someone set to care for someone else’s interest and that someone; including constellations like elected official and citizen) have conflicting interests.

   A very early scene shows the client and her husband having an interview with the protagonist, who calms their fears about costs with the claim that they would pay nothing in fees in return for a 30 percent share of any damages awarded, should he win the case for them. Here, we can immediately see problems like the case being a one-off event for the plaintiffs but a potentially one-in-many for the lawyer, which leads to different math. For instance, for a plaintiff with a one-off case, a certain 200 grand might be better than a 50–50 shot at 600 grand (even if the expectation value is 300 grand and a 100-grand improvement). Indeed, the plaintiff might even prefer the certain money over an 80-20 shot at 600 grand, because even that leaves a 20 percent risk of getting nothing. The lawyer, on the other hand, would be much more interested in the expectation value, because he will win around half of all 50–50 shots in the long haul, and if he goes without recompense in this case, he has a new chance to win the next time around, and the next, and the next, etc.

   In my understanding, the protagonist would have received 30 percent even of the settlement, but differences between the percentages for a settlement and for awarded damages can lead to further conflicts of interests, e.g. in that a lawyer who gets 10 percent of a settlement and 30 percent of awarded damages might take even a poor case to trial. In the other direction, with the same percentages for settlements and damages, a lawyer who has other cases in the pipeline (very much unlike the down-on-his-luck protagonist) might settle the one case against the best interests of his client in order to have time for the next one.

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   Side-note:

   Such outcome-based fees actually underlie restrictions in e.g. Germany. When I first heard this, I was quite surprised, but issues like the above can give such restrictions some justification.

   As a counterpoint, there are at least two factors that speak in their favor: Firstly, as in the movie, even someone with little current money has an increased chance of having a lawyer take on his case. Secondly, the above notwithstanding, the lawyer has interests that align more closely with his client than if he just receives a fixed fee or an hour-based remuneration.

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   Other issues can occur. In the film, it seems that the protagonist’s decisions were in part motivated by a wish to see the physicians involved punished for their malpractice (and, likely, largely based on very strong statements by an expert witness in the lead up, to the approximate effect that they had no business practicing medicine). If the plaintiffs shared that sentiment, there need not be any problem, but what if they primarily were concerned with the money, e.g. to ensure that the patient could receive treatment for the foreseeable future? Vice versa, what if the plaintiffs wished to “see justice done” and the lawyer only had his eyes on the money? Likewise, the down-on-his-luck protagonist might have been willing to risk going to trial in the hope that a spectacular victory would turn his career around, while yet another loss would have hurt far less than the victory would have benefited him.

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   Side-note:

   Whether civil cases should be used for such punitive goals, or whether this should be the role solely of criminal cases, is another question, but both plaintiffs and lawyers might reach their own conclusions on such matters. (The more so, as might have been the case with OJ Simpson, when a jury incorrectly found the perpetrator innocent.)

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5. There were signs that the justice system (and/or the specific judge at hand) was more keen on keeping costs/work down than in seeing justice served. The same problem is most definitely an issue in Germany and is certainly a motivator behind the deeply flawed and very dangerous U.S. system of plea bargaining in criminal proceedings.

6. There were also demonstrations of how personal sym-/antipathies between judges, lawyers, whatnot, can negatively effect the clients’ outcomes. Indeed, an at least partial cause of the judge’s strong antipathy for the protagonist was that he had forced a case to trial that, in the judge’s eyes, should never have gone to trial. (But the plaintiffs won, so the judge certainly did not get the last laugh.)

7. The protagonist did not exactly shine in terms of e.g. professional ethics, and might not have been better than the defendants. For instance, he engaged in serial lying and at least one theft of mail, be it to further his case or his own agenda. For instance, the aforementioned handling of the settlement offer is very problematic, and might, alone, make him as unfit for his profession as the behavior of the cheating physician.

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   Side-note:

   However, drawing borders between his professional shortcomings and his more private ones can be tricky. For instance, overuse of alcohol is usually a private shortcoming, but when it interferes with his work, we land in the professional field.

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8. A silent theme was a focus on appearances over substance—a very common problem in the real world. The original cover-up of the malpractice can be seen as an example, but the issue is recurring and especially so with the protagonist, who has trouble winning (indeed, even getting) cases, yet walks around in a sharp suit, who pretends towards others that he has a secretary when he does not, etc. A particular telling point came early in the movie, shortly before his first meeting with the plaintiffs, when he left his office—and, with the apparent sole purpose that the plaintiffs should see the note, slapped a note on his own door that judge so-and-so had called. (Helping to create the impression both that he had a secretary to leave a note behind and that a judge had wanted something from him—a type of trick worthy of Saul Goodman.)

Taxes and nowhere to escape II (2026-03-23)

An earlier entry dealt with having having taxes and nowhere to escape (also see links from there). In the interim, I have seen more bad ideas and/or poor attitudes in a similar family.

Consider e.g. various idiocies by Kathy Hochul^e ([1]), including misapplying “patriotic” to millionaires who have stayed, donated to her causes, or similar. (It is absurd to view it as patriotic to finance an inefficient, disabling, and destructive Leftist apparatus and to consent to over-taxation. Moreover, those who do stay, likely and for the better part, have other motivations, e.g. an unwillingness to uproot themselves.) Worse, she proceeds to refer to Republican voters as “not New Yorkers”—an inexcusable presumption. (Also note two older texts for more on on such presumptions: [2], [3].)

[1] contains more on other problems, including around California and the threat of an “exit tax”. Exit taxes effectively force a citizen to pay to leave, something virtually DDR-ian. (And if combined with say an “unrealized gains tax”, a grave injustice in its own right, the results could be disastrous, possibly to the point of being an effective bar against leaving. Cf. parts of [4] and of a page on taxes more generally.)

A more subtle example is given by “home energy scores”^e in Washington: Potentially, it will be impossible to sell a house without incurring the costs of energy certification and, more importantly, expensive upgrades, should the house not be up to the standard. While a bad enough idea for those who remain in state, it can be very cumbersome for those who move to another state, creating an effective indirect exit tax—and one that might end up hitting the average guy harder than the millionaires. (Also consider the typically already greater costs of an interstate move, how much harder it can be to handle a house sale from out of state and/or at a longer distance from the house, and similar complications.)

More generally, this reflects typical Leftists attitudes like it somehow being immoral to wish to avoid even excessive taxes, the sole purposes of the citizen being to finance the government and provide the Left with votes, who has how much money being something for the government/the Left to decide, whatnot. I am particularly reminded of Mona Sahlin (Swedish Social-Democrat and erstwhile almost-PM, and someone who makes, say, Kamala Harris look intelligent and competent), who wished to indoctrinate the Swedish people into thinking that paying taxes was “cool”.

Misuse of “ayatollah” (2026-03-22)

As a brief language note on a frequent recent annoyance, “ayatollah” is a religious classification, which does not translate as “leader of Iran”, and which should not be used to imply “leader of Iran”. While being an ayatollah appears to be a requirement to hold that position, there are a great many ayatollahs who do not. As a consequence of the “many”, it is also dubious to speak of “the ayatollah” in a context that would imply uniqueness in the manner of “the pope”.

A nation of immigrants (2026-03-21)

The claim that the U.S. is a nation of immigrants has hit the rhetoric again, with the usual recent implication that “and therefore we should allow all illegal immigrants to stay” (except that the users of the rhetoric are likely to use some misleading and distorting PC-phrase like “undocumented immigrants”) or “and therefore we should have no restrictions on immigration”.

While the claim has much truth in it, the conclusions are much more dubious or outright wrong. Consider e.g.:

1. The immigrants historically making up the U.S. have been overwhelmingly legal immigrants, and the restrictions to entry have for long stretches of time been strict, e.g. in that the Ellis Island era saw inspections of physical and mental health, which could result in someone who had just crossed the Atlantic (a much lengthier and more expensive undertaking than today—let alone than moving in from Mexico) being refused entry.

   (The exact restrictions have naturally varied greatly over time.)

2. While culture (and other) clashes between locals and immigrants are nothing new, the scope has changed considerably, as the proportions of non-British, non-European, non-White, non-Christian, whatnot, immigrants have increased massively and continually. As such changes take place, old approaches need to be re-evaluated, and even legal immigration might need to be handled with greater care—and note, again, that legal immigration was far from a guaranteed right in the past.

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   Side-note:

   Leftist readers: Note that this has nothing to do with “being better”—it is a matter of “being different”. In an “all other factors sufficiently equal” scenario, larger differences cause larger problems with co-existence, integration, and similar, than do smaller differences. This is a fact of life that can not and must not be waved away with e.g. sloganeering about “diversity” or defamatory hate rhetoric about “racism” or “White supremacy”.

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3. The scope of (even legal) immigration also needs to consider factors like the current “carrying capacity” of society.

   To this note another issue of changing circumstances, namely the greater and very expensive social nets of today: If a 19th-century Swede crossed over to take up life in Minnesota, as very many did, he broadly had the choice between financing his own life (be it through work or, much more rarely, savings), hoping for enough private charity, and starving on the street. If a 21st-century Somali does the same, as very many do, he might spend years living on the tax-payers’ dime. (Even assuming that he does not become part of the extreme types of fraud recently revealed in Minnesota.)

   The system that faced the 19th-century Swede allowed for a greater proportion of immigrants before “other people’s money” ran out, and immigration needs to be re-evaluated in light of this too.

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   Side-note:

   Also note more general issues of e.g. sustainability touched upon in [1] and other older entries, which also have some overlap with and/or other relevance to the current discussion.

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4. The same “welfare” changes can result in poor incentives and a self-selection of immigrants that is less digestible. While many past immigrants were given exaggerated and highly misleading promises of success by various commercial interests, few (in my impression) came over with a belief that they would reach the promised success without hard work—and most of them were used to hard work in their countries of origin. If a modern immigrant is fed similar exaggerations (or, of his own, builds a false image) it is much more likely to involve an easy life, with little work and government aid.

5. Crime among immigrants is also nothing new, but current levels of organized crime are—and even in the past, taking in immigrants belonging to or associated with organized crime has been a mistake (as with e.g. variations on the mafia). It might have been done despite being a mistake but this does not justify repeating the mistake, on a larger scale, today. This the more so as the harm that can arise from organized crime might be larger than in the past, e.g. through replacing illegal sales of alcohol with illegal sales of fentanyl, or through the opportunities of large scale scams involving government money.

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   Side-note:

   This problem is made the worse by the lax law enforcement that plagues many Democrat-controlled areas. Resulting problems, however, are less an argument to be cautious about immigration and more to actually uphold the law.

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   Side-note:

   More generally, the mere fact that something was done in the past does not imply that it should be done today—by such arguments, refrigerators should still use freon and physicians should give thalidomide to pregnant women. Instead, we should keep what brings more good than harm (quality immigration in controlled doses might well do so) and remove what brings more harm than good (e.g. immigration by members of organized crime).

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Some caution about more speculative problems might also be warranted, e.g. the possibility that some foreign nation (notably, China and/or Iran) sends nationals as seemingly regular immigrants but with a hidden agenda (e.g. to perform industrial espionage resp. to form sleeper cells). I remain agnostic on whether such problems truly are a danger or whether they reflect undue fears among proponents, but such concerns can justify more targeted restrictions (if in doubt, in the form of more thorough vetting) on immigration whenever they are sufficiently plausible.

I am in two minds as to whether e.g. Islamist Sharia-pushing is a special case of the first item or something in its own right. At a minimum, it is justified to point out explicitly the new dangers that arise when some group of immigrants bring and insist upon values that force changes upon the existing population, go contrary to or require changes of established law, violate core constitutional regulations like the U.S. “establishment clause”, or similar. I also reiterate my claim that freedom of religion requires a right to freedom from religion, in that we must all be free to follow our own religious convictions, must not fall subject to religious restrictions that we do not believe in, and similar.

Accusations against the dead (2026-03-21)

In a comparatively short time, I have heard claims that:

1. Bob Barker, now a few years dead, would (a) have been guilty of various and sundry old accusations of sexual misbehavior, (b) would have tried to make his game-show hostesses lie about the matter in public.

2. Union-darling César Chávez, more than four decades dead, would have committed deeds that would amount to an entire new #MeToo movement’s worth.

I will neither take a position on the truthfulness of these claims, nor repeat them in detail. (For obvious reasons, I have no knowledge of the matter beyond the fact that media report various claims.)

However, I do point to older writings on similar topics, including on the treatment of accusations ([1]) (originally motivated by the accusations raised against Brett Kavanaugh, decades after the alleged events, when he was nominated for the SCOTUS), various texts around the #MeToo movement (see [2], and various backlinks from there), and various texts around the Palme/Engström debacle (see an earlier entry and links).

I also raise the issue of speaking ill of the dead. While I do not subscribe to the idea that one simply should not do so (“de mortuis nil nisi bonum”), great care should be taken when it comes to accusations on disputable and/or previously unknown matters. This for the simple reason that the dead (even when they are innocent) cannot speak out in their own favor, they cannot bring up proof to the contrary, they cannot point to alibis, they cannot give their view of events (“Rashamon”), whatnot. With Bob Barker, he is just a few years dead, so why speak out now instead of five years ago, when he was alive? Better yet, in the spirit of [1], at a time when events were current?

Chávez, in turn, seems a pointless mark. Not only is he more than four decades dead (with the alleged deeds even further back), but little good can come of this. In particular, if someone had legitimate accusations to raise, they most certainly should have been raised at the time, to protect others. (The accusations against Chávez are far worse than against Barker and Kavanaugh, giving them an original far greater urgency that no longer exists.) To boot, the issues in [1] around time passed apply very strongly, in that Chávez might not have been able to mount a current defense, even assuming that he (a) was still alive, (b) is innocent, (c) would have been able to mount a strong such defense at the time of alleged events. (Who, e.g., can dig up an alibi for an event four decades later that could easily be found a mere four days, weeks, or even months later.)

From another angle: When it comes to important “legacies”, I would see it as best for history to focus on acts, accomplishments, whatnot, of core relevance—be they positive or negative. In the case of Chávez, then, the focus should be on union work and other activities of societal, political, whatnot, relevance.

Another potential issue is changing societal norms. While these are unlikely to be very relevant to the current cases around Chávez and Barker, they can be relevant in many other cases. For instance, in some other recent text (maybe, relating to Clinton; I only skimmed it and kept no link) a woman (a) complained that she, some decades ago, had been sexually-harassed-by-modern-standards, and (b) followed up by admitting to, after this harassment-by-modern-standards, having begun a consensual relationship with the man at hand. This raises serious questions about the legitimacy of these modern standards—on top of the problems with retroactive application of standards. I have, for instance, heard some women of older generations (maybe, including Phyllis Schafly) note how some things viewed as harassment today were outright welcome in earlier days, e.g through having a flattering effect or giving an “ego-boost”. If a man of, say, 1970 showed a certain behavior, saw women react positively, and kept it up because they reacted positively, why should he be condemned today? This the more so, as the same man, transplanted in time, might have taken a negative reaction today as reason to rapidly cease the behavior at hand.

Some remarks around the war on Iran (2026-03-18)

1. With the resignation of one Joe Kent from the National Counterterrorism Center, some debate has arisen as to whether Iran was an “imminent” threat to the U.S. (By reporting, he takes the view that it was not and that this “not” would make the attacks unwarranted. I have not dwelt deeper into his position.)

   In my eyes, this misses the point, and there is no need to take a position that “yes, the threat was imminent”. An imminent threat might be sufficient to justify the attacks, but it is not necessary:

   Firstly, there is a risk of some other point of no return being exceeded than, say, attacks coming from Iran. Notably, cf. an earlier entry, there were fears that Iran would in a reasonably short time acquire nuclear weapons and/or accumulate such masses of missiles, drones, and whatnots that it would be untouchable. Given that the regime in Iran is/was known to be evil and has a long history of acts of violence towards other nations (and, if irrelevant here, its own people), this is justification on par with or in excess of an imminent threat.

   ---

   Side-note:

   With, of course, some reservations for the type of imminent threat: In a reversal of the following point, an imminent threat need not be very dire and assuming a threat which is both imminent and very dire can change the equation—but it is then the direness more than the imminence that matters.

   A similar separation into e.g. what is important and what is urgent is common in other areas, including task scheduling: Getting away from a man-eating tiger is both important and urgent; getting to the toilet on time can sometimes be urgent, but is not, in comparison to escaping a tiger, that important; securing food for tomorrow can simultaneously be more important and less urgent than getting to the toilet on time.

   ---

   Secondly, threats do not need to be imminent to be very dire. For instance, there were years between Hitler’s rise to power and his first land grab, a long delay (with further land grabs) before WWII actually started, and another long delay before the U.S. joined the war. Likewise, while the Jews were targeted at an early stage, the lead-up to the actual Shoah was long. Here, it is important to tread much more carefully than with an imminent threat, because punishment might be extended not just before a crime has taken place but to someone who ultimately would not have performed the crime. However, the Iranian regime’s actions over close to five decades speak for themselves, including recent and ongoing proxy wars with Israel—not to mention expressly declared opinions around Jews, Israel, the U.S. and what fate is wished for these.

   From another angle, that the U.S. restricts its actions to threats (whether imminent or not) against the U.S. need not be wrong, but the threat against Israel was more imminent than towards the U.S., making Israeli strikes natural, if an “imminent threat” standard is applied. For the U.S. to strike with Israel is, then, a natural decision, to increase the effect, reduce retaliatory capacity faster, etc., even should there be no imminent threat to the U.S., it self.

2. Speaking of retaliatory capacity: For all Trump’s claims, Iran does not seem willing to go belly up and has preserved and uses such capacity even now, closing to three weeks into the attacks.

   This is a pointer that concerns about the Iranian build up were justified, but also to how hard it is to knock out an opponent in control of a large territory and a large military. Also note what problems Russia has had in the Ukraine, despite boots on the ground. While I doubt that the current weeks will turn into years, as for Russia, it is no Perry Expedition either. (But the attacks still seem to be on or ahead of schedule with Iran, while even, say, an 8-week victory would be a great accomplishment.)

   A particular point of interest is how much of its leadership Iran has lost without collapsing.

3. The USS Gerald Ford appears to be withdrawing in the wake of a laundry fire (!). As I understand reporting, this is due to “qualify of life” issues, not a matter of combat ability, but it is still a bad sign: Here we have the apparently largest warship ever built, a multi-billion dollar affair, and a mere laundry fire brings about a retreat. This points to very problematic design weaknesses and/or weaknesses around ship-internal workflows/whatnot. (I have to be vague for lack of insider knowledge.) Moreover, it is a strong further pointer to how smaller-but-more ships can be of greater value than larger-but-fewer (cf. an earlier entry), e.g. in that a laundry fire in any individual smaller ship, in an equivalent situation, would have just brought about the retreat of the single smaller ship. (Or, in a thought experiment with an alternate setup using a dedicated laundry ship, just the replacement of the laundry ship. Whether such a division of responsibility makes sense, I leave unstated.)

Getting more from the government than is taken (2026-03-15)

A piece from Townhall^e yesterday makes some points about taxes that those unversed with the topic might want to consider.

For my part, some points around one of the paragraphs:

In the writings of John Locke and Adam Smith, we find the seminal idea of the “benefit principle.” As developed more clearly in the writings of Swedish economists Knut Wicksell and Erik Lindahl, it says, “No one should pay more in taxes than the value of benefits they receive from the state.”

The last part is quite interesting. Let us say that we adapt a variation of this principle, that we should all have at least a “net zero” from the existence of the government—ideally, a net gain.

Clearly, this would make government much more palatable. Indeed, a problem with government is that so many of us have a net loss, be it through diminished growth, loss of disposable income in taxes, destruction of wealth through price inflation, whatnot, with no even remotely adequate return.

First, the question of whether this is at all possible. With something even resembling a typical modern Western government the answer is almost certainly “no”—quite possibly, “Hell no!”. There is too much waste, too much bureaucracy, too much interference with market forces, too much that the government tries to do that the citizen, one way or the other, could do better himself, etc. In effect, we have something similar to gambling: The players pay in a certain amount, after which a lesser amount is paid out with a new distribution—even the citizens as a whole, looking at an average over everyone, do worse. The idea, then, that the citizens would all be able to simultaneous have that “net zero” or that net gain is as silly as believing that the players in a casino or the bettors on a race track can do the same. (In a casino, it might happen over shorter times, through the literal or metaphorical roll of the dice, but not in the even remotely long run—the casino always wins. In horse racing, the betting is often rigged through a “parimutuel” system to prevent even short-time effects in this regard.)

This the more so when we look at just money. The question, then, is what positive other effects the government can bring. Largely what arises from a night-watchman state, e.g. the protection of the citizens from criminal elements and from foreign invaders. A typical “welfare” state, however, does not truly do a satisfactory job at this. If in doubt, doing so would reduce what is left to spend on redistributions, public healthcare, whatnot. (And note how the idea of redistributions, on a non-trivial scale, implies that the government is explicitly working to favor the one group over the other, making the “return on investment” even worse for those not favored—as if a casino were to play with different rules to artificially push the one group into profit at the equally artificial cost of another group.) A more workable solution, then, would be to move on to a night-watchman state or some other form of small government that builds on the night-watchman state. (For brevity, I will just use “night-watchman state” in the continuation.) Focus on what brings value to the citizen and is hard to achieve by private means—unlike e.g. redistributions (for the better part, destroys more value than it brings and what value it brings benefits special interest groups) and healthcare (better done privately and is often abused as exactly a form of redistribution). This with the added bonus that the less money passes through government hands, the less money is wasted (lost to the bookies/the casino, as it were).

A further issue, and one further pointing to a night-watchman state as the better chance is the many costs that are not related to taxes and lost growth—and note how the original quote speaks of “pay more in taxes” (emphasis added; also see side-note). I have already mentioned inflation, which is the maybe most important example, at least in times of non-trivial inflation. Other cases might include unnecessary or excessive work, e.g. to handle tax filings (a less obvious cost of taxes), to queue at the DMV (to follow a U.S. stereotype), or to otherwise struggle with red tape. Worse, many countries have or have had mandatory and poorly paid military service (including both Sweden and Germany), and many others have resorted to a draft in war times. Mandatory schooling in many countries causes a massive investment of time for the students and does not deliver enough value in return. Etc.

From another angle, the question is whether it would be enough that government delivers on the above idea (which big government will not). We also have to look at alternatives, and if some other system can do something better, cheaper, with a higher return, whatnot, the cost of government really should include the opportunity cost for the citizens of not using that system. (By analogy, if the citizens, somehow, magically, broke even or better on the horses but would have earned more investing their money, they should invest their money and not bet on horses—or, at a minimum, as long as they deal with their own money, be given the choice between investing and betting. Government, of course, almost proverbially deals with someone else’s money.) Factoring in how poorly, inefficiently, and often ineffectively governments tend to work, this is yet another pointer towards a night-watchman state.

Finally, then: If I want a good return on my money, what should I do with it? Spend it at the racetrack or in the casino? No. (Also cf. above.) Hand it over to big government? No. Invest it, found an own business, and/or purchase what brings me personally the most value? Yes. (And with a “yes” to other similar alternatives too.) To the last, note that I know better than the government what brings me value (and that this value is not necessarily of an even remotely monetary kind—unlike, say, winnings from investments). To investments, note that this need not involve e.g. big stock purchases—even safer and more stable options like various types of bonds and bank accounts do better than the government (qua “investment”).

Drones, missiles, and non-nuclear destruction (2026-03-13)

A few semi-connected remarks:

1. The Ukraine–Russia and Israel/U.S.–Iran wars, as well as the earlier Israel–Hamas/Hezbollah wars (fighting, whatnot), have shown the value of drones for warfare, including as comparatively cheap weapons for mass attacks (as opposed to expensive such and/or such for surveillance and information gathering).

   To boot, somewhat low-cost weapons have been of importance more generally in recent years, e.g. in that pre-war Iran has had a strong control over its waters by using a plethora of small and fast boats instead of regular navy ships. I also re-iterate my question of when it is better to have a single F35 and when a large number of Spitfires (cf. [1]).

2. Drones and drone warfare might exemplify something from an earlier entry, namely issues around technological development and temporary superiority.

   Notably, Iran has (according to some reports) a bit of a head start with drones, while the U.S. is drawing on Ukrainian expertise to compensate—but is rapidly taking the lead through superior technology (including, according to some text, greater inter-drone communications and coordination).

   Notably, drones might be highly effective today because it is a new technology to which insufficient adaptation has taken place. When such adaptation follows, including through better detection and counter-attacks, drones might have a diminished value.

3. However, chances are that future warfare will have a much more “unmanned” (fewer humans in non-remote involvement; maybe, fewer human even in remote involvement) character than in the past, that fighting units will often be smaller-but-more-numerous, and that the battlefields of the future will have as little in common with that of just a few years ago as that of a few years ago had with those of Napoleon. (Indeed, even the idea of a battlefield in a more literal sense might be increasingly irrelevant.)

   I am indeed reminded of a sci-fi book that I read as a kid, that more than predicted current developments in terms of warfaring agents of various kinds, including attacks by big swarms of insect-sized drones of some sort.

   ---

   Addendum:

   (2026-04-01)

   In an earlier side-note, I said:

   I believed this book to be “Fiasco” by Stanislaw Lem, and named it so in my draft, but the description on Wikipedia is a poor fit for my memory. I will arrange for a re-read and clarify at a later time.

   In the interim, I have re-read the book, with a mixed result:

   On the one hand, it contains more than enough to justify the claims of the main text—as well as very thought-worthy material on what might be called the politics and the philosophy of war (some of it potentially highly relevant to the war against Iran), and on quite a few other fields/topics/issues/whatnot, e.g. clashes of culture. (In this, it is an excellent example of one my pet hypotheses—that someone who sticks to stereotypically “male” fiction has a much better chance of finding something truly thought-worthy than someone who sticks to corresponding “female” fiction.)

   On the other, I suspect that I have, over the decades, merged two different books in my memory, “Fiasco” being one and the other a book with more time spent on the surface of an alien planet and with a greater presence of weapons of a biological nature (not necessarily bio weapons in the common current sense). This merge would explain why I had problems with fitting the Wikipedia summary with my memory. (I will given an update, should I stumble upon this other book in the future, but I will not deliberately attempt to find it.)

   ---

4. More generally, the real world might be catching up with sci-fi (or, maybe, just the sci-fi of my youth). For instance, laser rays (and other types of energy and/or “ray” weapons) are a sci-fi mainstay. Such appear to be almost production ready for anti-drone activities, which is good, but might in the foreseeable future be available as more offensive weapons, which could be truly, truly bad—potentially dangerous on a level that only nukes exceed, through speed of action and difficulty of defense, and with less incentives for restraint.

   Railguns are another technology that has been on the prototype stage for a longish time, but might transition to real-life use in the foreseeable future. (And both railguns and lasers could drastically reduce the costs for defenses against missile and drone attacks.)

   Then there is the use of AI in warfare...

5. On the other hand, Trump seems set on having a battleship built, despite battleships fairing poorly against expectations in WWII and being out of fashion since then. Maybe, he is making a mistake; maybe, technological developments have turned again, so that battleships will fare better. (And, of course, maybe Trump is just beating a drum for effect.)

   ---

   Side-note:

   To speculate on such a turning, lasers and whatnots could reduce the vulnerability of battleships to aerial attacks, not limited to drones, while the replacement of airplanes with drones and missiles could allow a battleship to take over much of what an aircraft carrier used to do while having more of the “look and feel” of a traditional battleship.

   For my own part, off the top of my head, I might see greater promise in submarines. Ditto, further variations of the large-swarm-of-smaller-things, say, with a fleet of smaller ships bringing a similar accumulated tonnage, missile launching capability, number of drones, whatnot, to that single battleship.

   ---

6. Two strong motivators behind hitting Iran with some urgency was the dual fear that Iran would manage to get an A-bomb (based, among other things, on bragging during a negotiation), and that the sheer build-up of drones and missiles might make the country untouchable through being able to wreak enough havoc on its enemies in retaliation to make attacks worth the price. (What might be viewed as a poor man’s version of “mutually assured destruction”, but with the upside, from an Iranian perspective, that few opposing countries would have been able to live up to the “mutually”.)

   This plays in with an older thought of mine, namely that “the bomber always gets through”, and the later addition of e.g. ICBMs, might have been more important than the development of atomic bombs for putting civilians at risk, for changing the nature of politics relating to military and international issues, whatnot. (See an excursion in [2] for some minor earlier words on this.)

No nation building (2026-03-09)

In the wake of the attacks on Iran, the unwillingness of Trump to engage in nation building has been mentioned repeatedly in the news. Looking at the costs and limited success of many previous efforts (most notably, Iraq and Afghanistan, which sandwich Iran), this is likely a sound attitude.

However, the question can be raised to what degree past experiences go back to nation building being problematic, per se, and to what degree to implementation errors. The former question, I will leave unaddressed and I do not yet have a firm opinion on the matter—the more so, as “nation building” is a vague term and could have different implications in different texts. (But I do have the concern that nation building by the politicians of country A in country B can leave country B infected with many of the politician problems of country A—including big and “nanny” government, too influential and meddling politicians, and too much government planning/too little market economy.) To the latter, several big-picture errors are often occurring (with no claim of completeness):

1. A naive over-focus on democracy over civil rights, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, etc. This, in particular, with some apparent idea that “once they have a democracy, things will automatically turn out for the best” (something falsified on a number on occasions, including in Weimar Germany a century ago and almost routinely outside the Western world) or a view of democracy as an end in it self, instead of a means to ends like preservation of civil rights and a flowering economy.

2. A failure to consider cultural and other differences that can require another implementation relative, say, the post-WWII reconstructions of Germany and Japan. In an overlap with the previous item, this includes weak democratic traditions and strong traditions of using governmental positions for personal enrichment/power/whatnot. Other issues include degree of law-abidingness, “high trust” vs. “low trust” mentalities, the degree to which insider–outsider divisions are common (e.g. between an extended family or clan vs. everyone else), whether justice is sought from the law or through violent actions, and many others.

3. A failure to consider internal divisions of the country, including into ethnic and religious groups, in a sufficient manner. Such divisions, however, have a long history of causing problems, be it internal violence, a majority group using the power of the government to oppress minority groups through electoral domination (or, outside democracies, other types of governmental influence), or otherwise.

   A special case or a problem in its own right can be to work with the blanket assumption that what is within the current borders must remain as one country, imposing an indivisibility that barely held even for the U.S. and which might be untenable in many other cases. (The rapid collapse of Yugoslavia, an unnatural conglomerate, might stand as a particular warning.)

4. A failure to consider the risks from creating a power vacuum.

   Herein, unfortunately, is a dilemma, and potentially one being a great problem for that nation building, per se: The choice often amounts to either leaving large portions of an old regime, “apparatus”, whatnot, in power, or to risk a chaotic, unpredictable, or otherwise harmful situation as a country (ideally) transitions to good conditions—or (often) transitions to something worse.

   ---

   Side-note:

   Note that I do not endorse leaving the old regime in power. What is the lesser evil will depend on the circumstances, including how problematic the regime was, what monsters may appear when the dragon is gone (cf. an earlier entry), how ready the people is for democracy per the first two items, how willing the old regime might be to accept a strictly transitory role, etc.

   ---

5. Strongly overlapping with the previous item, a failure to consider existing power structures, the risk that an “old guard” rises to power in a new guise, that power in the new government goes to a leading prior opposition, even when that opposition is not suited for the task, and similar.

Parts of this can be subsumed under the ideas that “they are just like us” and “more politics [government/whatnot] is better”, the first often being naive (even should the differences fade over time), the second reflecting the attitudes of politicians and the like more than any insight into the matter (indeed, in most cases, “less [...] is better”).

The case of modern Germany is interesting: It is a success in so far as it has had an absence of great internal violence, wars with other nations, coups, whatnot, and in that it has reached considerable economic success (which, however, is now based on past accomplishments and not current growth). In other parts, however, it is a sad failure, with a constitution that makes no mention of Rechtsstaatlichkeit or meaningful civil rights, but which uses a vague and arbitrarily interpretable “Würde des Menschen” (“human dignity”) and, in parts, seems to force a Leftist take on politics. To boot, its more administrative parts also lack the strengths of the U.S. constitution, despite this being the most obvious source of inspiration. (To “Leftist take”: While I have not investigated the exact history of the constitution, it is notable that it arose under the influence of the U.S. under Democrats and with the shadow of FDR still present, the U.K. under Labour, and France under the French—not an auspicious setup.)

What the German constitution does do is to demand democracy, with no apparent thought for the fact that Hitler rose to power using mostly democratic means and using weaknesses in the Rechtsstaat, which he promptly abolished once in power. This is a good older illustration of the aforementioned “over-focus on democracy over civil rights, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, etc.”. The right conclusions would certainly have included democracy—but Rechtsstaatlichkeit and civil rights the more so. This failure is something for which Germany is still paying, e.g. through utterly insufficient protections of speech and widespread problems with e.g. “We the Politicians” and “We the Civil Servants” mentalities (instead of “We the People”) that arose or re-arose much faster than in e.g. the U.S.—with resulting problems that include mismanagement, very big government, nanny practices, whatnot. Even as a democracy the modern Germany is highly deficient through unholy alliances between parties that should be natural enemies—and unholy alliances that betray the voters and reduce the value of any vote given.

Plan economies and “Operation Petticoat” (2026-03-07)

The movie “Operation Petticoat” gives interesting illustrations of the problems with plan economies:

The plan economy of the navy (military, FDR, whatnot) is insufficient to solve the general lack of supplies and appears inept in distributing what there is appropriately. (While the movie is fictional, I have heard enough of similar problems from real-life sources, be it with regard to WWII or other wars.)

As a result, a U.S. WWII submarine repeatedly has problems with requisitioning essentials, be it spare parts or toilet paper, resulting in various ingenious but often problematic or, even, outright illegal means being used to solve these problems.

The solutions, however, are very egocentric and come at the cost of others in a manner that not only subverts the official planning (such subversion is a very recurring theme in real life and must be considered in a pro-/contra-analysis) but might lead to, say, a more crucial submarine being unnecessarily delayed in its deployment—not to mention the various extra costs that arise for others through the unplanned disappearance of this-and-that, the need for replacements and repairs, whatnot, that exceed the costs of a more orderly solution.

To boot, both the plan economy as intended and the circumvention attempts can bring success and promotions to the wrong men. Consider e.g. how someone who (literally or metaphorically) gives a better presentation can be awarded plan material that someone else might have used better (but who had focused on building his professional skills—not his presentation skills), how those willing to break laws and regulations are far better positioned to circumvent the problems of a plan economy, and how who-knows-whom can play in both with a plan economy and circumventions of that plan economy.

Imagine instead variations of a free market (to the degree possible within the military). Say that a submarine captain has a budget and that he uses the money in the budget to buy what he needs, be it from a navy-internal supplier or from civilians. With enough money, what he needs will be forthcoming; if he lacks the money to overcome a supply deficit, the supply will at least go to someone with the right money. The suppliers know that they get money for supplying and will, therefore, be intent on procurement, which gives manufacturers more opportunities to earn money, which encourages manufacturing of what is needed, which reduces the supply deficit. If an exact request cannot be met, suppliers have an incentive to find workarounds and not e.g. excuses to refuse requisition orders. If in doubt, the captain will be less able to point fingers at others (“My requisitions were denied! It is not my fault!”), even when justified, and more likely to search for unconventional (but legal) solutions to get things working. Competition between suppliers can lead to downward pressure on prices and reduce the risk that someone just siphons off tax-payers’ money. Etc. Also note advantages like better price signalling and resource allocation in the overall economy, including when military demand clashes with civilian.

Cautions around Iran (2026-03-06)

While the war against the Iranian regime seems to be going very well so far, there are always points of concern, including the risk of election outcomes that favor the Left and the risk of further Islamist hatred of the U.S. and Israel bringing new generations of terrorists.

One that has been particularly on my mind, however, is what happens if China makes a sudden grab for Taiwan. This is not necessarily very likely, but if a grab were to take place, say, next week, the West would be in a poor position to react, with U.S. resources tied up against Iran and various missiles and whatnots being consumed at a high rate, and with both the U.S. and large parts of the remaining West having a big resource drain in the Ukraine. This, of course, on top of more long-standing complications like how China is in the immediate proximity of Taiwan while the U.S. is on the wrong side of the Pacific Ocean. As a bonus, any attack by China would have to share the news with the situation in Iran, making wholesale and worldwide outrage less likely—the more so, as the attacks on Iran might be used to invoke a “hypocrisy defense” against the U.S. in propaganda. (The attacks on Iran and a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan are not truly comparable, but they might be close enough for propaganda purposes.)

Another interesting point (I would not go as far as “concern”) is the potential weakness of aerial superiority. Right here, right now, I see no problems, but matters could be different against a sufficiently strong (notably, technologically advanced) opponent or as technology develops further. I particularly recall the Soviet situation in Afghanistan (neighboring, of course, Iran), where the Soviets long appear to have an easy time through dominance of air space, including through heavily armed and virtually untouchable helicopters. The hitch? They were untouchable because the Afghans had very little in terms of anti-aircraft weaponry. Then the U.S. brought in Stinger missiles and the untouchable became very touchable over night. While there is very little risk that someone would manage to give the Iranians a similar game changer (who, how, and with what?), the example is illustrative.

More generally, technological superiority is fleeting and must be constantly renewed in order to not disappear. The success of Perry against Japan, e.g., was helped by a mixture of extreme Japanese isolationism (and resulting technological retardation relative the U.S.) and the novelty of Paixhans guns, which allowed easy bombardment with explosive shells, to which the Japanese had inadequate ability to defend and retaliate. Matters changed rapidly after that, and the same ships with the same weapons might have been sent packing in embarrassed defeat just a few decades later—or, without that time delay, if used against the British Islands instead of the Japanese. (While, say, the Japan of WWII would have easily overrun the entire U.S. military of Perry’s days—and, barring manpower issues, the rest of the world’s military too.) To this, keep in mind that technological developments are far faster today than in the mid-19th century.

The dragon that you know and be careful what you wish for (2026-03-04)

Issues like the rise of ISIS in the post-Saddam Iraq are well illustrated by a puppet movie that was aired on TV a few times during my Swedish childhood, which had aspects of “the devil [here, dragon] that you know” and “be careful what you wish for”. To my recollection (and with corresponding reservations for errors):

The king’s castle had a dragon living in its immediate vicinity. Unwilling to let this go on, the king ordered a knight to drive the dragon away, which he did. Soon, the country-side was overrun by many lesser monsters, which had previously stayed away out of fear of the dragon, and which proved to be a far greater problem than the dragon had been. Eventually, the king saw himself forced to invite the dragon back, thereby returning to the status quo ante.

In this story, the dragon was still alive, still as powerful, and still as able to act as a deterrent towards the other monsters. In most other cases, this is not true. Saddam, e.g., was dead and, even had he been alive, bringing him into a position of sufficient power to defeat ISIS might have required first defeating ISIS, in a variation on the Catch-22 theme. Indeed, it is often the case that events progress in a manner that makes it hard or impossible to restore the status quo ante by any means, as with the U.S. prohibition (as one of many examples in a similar family of regulatory failures): The combination of strong restrictions on alcohol and the continued strong wish to consume alcohol opened the door for illegal suppliers, poured money down the pockets of criminals for pouring alcohol down the throats of drinkers, and brought on an increase in organized crime that did not go away once the prohibition was repealed—the monsters had gained a strong foothold and were not leaving voluntarily.

Looking at the toppling of tyrants, governments, whatnot, it is often the case that what comes after is worse than what came before, as with the somewhat recent replacements of broadly secular dictators with Islamist movements in portions of the Middle East (and the replacement of Saddam a bit earlier), and as with many violent replacements of kings with revolutionary leaders. Such a toppling might then move a country or people out of the ashes into the fire (to continue the use of clichés).

Other cases yet include ideas like “defunding the police”: Even if we assume that the Leftist narratives about the police are true (I stress my skepticism), we have to ask what comes next. With less law enforcement, it is only to be expected that crime will rise, and chances are that the consequences of this rise will more than outweigh any gains from defunding the police. Indeed, the “blue” states and cities that have tried various types of defunding and/or other restrictions on law enforcement (e.g. laxer rules for shop lifting) have seen very problematic developments. Either the police was not a dragon or it was a dragon that was a lesser evil than the monsters that came in its stead.

Cases like “defunding the police” also include a failure to consider changes in behavior, norms, goalposts, whatnot. A good example is speed limits. If, say, a certain road has a speed limit of 70 km/h and many drive at 90 km/h, the limit notwithstanding, why not just take things for what they are, increase the limit to 90 km/h, and save the need to e.g. do the occasional speed-trap day? Well, from what I have heard, the results tend to be that drivers still exceed the limit by about the same amount—just that they now exceed a baseline of 90 km/h instead of 70 km/h. A speed limit at 70 km/h might not be much of a dragon and monster deterrent, but replacing it with an even lesser dragon results in an even lesser monster deterrent, while failing to remove the issue of speed-limit violations.

Use of distractions in politics (2026-03-04)

Following the attacks on Iran, some Leftists have imputed that Trump attacked for no better reason than to distract from whatever misdeeds of his would be revealed in the Epstein files—despite no such misdeed currently being known and despite oddities of the involved cost–benefit analysis. (To the last, note e.g. the cost to the U.S., the potential humanitarian cost, and the major risk that the war would backfire in terms of Trump’s popularity. To boot, in as far as anything prosecutable, not just popularity affecting, was revealed, the attacks would have brought no obvious practical benefit.) If, shortly before the attacks, some major revelation had been found, such claims of a distraction might or might not have had some credibility, but this condition is not given, and we must, to give the claims credence, assume that Trump was foreseeing or fearing an upcoming revelation and, naively, attacked to preempt the revelation in the news flow. (Naively, because later news tends to push earlier news out—not the other way around. This both in the news flow and in the minds of the voters and whatnots.)

Chances are that what happens is the opposite: These Leftists try to use the war to put attention on Trump and Epstein, and to create an impression of a connection using the attacks as “proof” to cover for their lack of any real proof. It is, then, not Trump who tries to distract from Epstein-issues but the Leftists who try to call attention to them (be the issues real or imaginary).

However, the idea that someone uses some type of distraction in politics can be valid. (Notwithstanding that speculation about motives might be necessary, including what is maliciousness and what incompetence, and which of several purposes might be followed in case of maliciousness.) Consider climate hysteria, for which genuine potential concerns have been exaggerated and feed into an enormous machinery of panic mongering, with results that include school children leaving school to go protesting instead of studying—often, thereby, proving their ignorance and the need to study more. Now, if the broad masses are obsessing sufficiently about the climate, if newspapers are sufficiently filled with climate panic, whatnot, then there is less room for other, often more dire, problems to be discussed and criticized, to influence voting patterns, etc.

Consider e.g. some dire issues that either do not get enough space or only do so in non-Leftist circles (and imagine if school children developed the right sense of urgency about these): Ever-growing government debt, unsustainable “welfare” systems of various kinds, and unsustainable levels of immigration. Or, with a wider net and potential lesser comparability to climate issues (or what the Left claims on climate issues), the destruction of education and science through ideological contamination, increasing restrictions on e.g. free speech and privacy, lobbyist influence on politicians, big government (as such), and the destruction of economic growth through poor policies.

Declaration of war an atavism (2026-03-01)

In comments around the attacks on Iran, there is contention around the rights of the POTUS vs. those of Congress, some of which goes back to the Congressional right to declare war. Without taking sides on the bigger issues, I would contend that declarations of war are largely beside the point, of too little relevance in today’s world, and, arguably, outright atavistic. (The implication of which might be more that the U.S. constitution, in response, needs to be reformed in relevant regards than that it should be interpreted in a certain direction.)

This in at least four, partially overlapping, regards:

Firstly, declarations of war in a formal sense appear to be rare in the modern world, in general, and certainly are so where specifically the U.S. is concerned. I have not attempted to gain an overview in detail, but a frequent claim is that the U.S. has not (de jure) declared war upon any country against which it (de facto) has waged war since WWII. Looking at the news, I cannot recall the last time that I saw claims like “X declared war upon Y”, while claims like “troops from X crossed the border of Y” or “[bombs/missiles/drones] from X attacked Y” are recurring—much in contrast to the early days of WWII, where England and France declared war upon Germany and actual fighting was postponed.

Secondly, the world of today is far more fast-moving and distances are, in a manner of speaking, far shorter than even in the days of WWII, let alone at the time of the writing of the U.S. constitution, which makes the idea of declaring war less relevant. Looking at e.g. “the Federalist Papers”, there seemed to an assumption that there would be no standing army in the modern sense, implying that any major war action would require raising, equipping, and, maybe, training troops, which could be an expensive and drawn out affair. Moving troops was a much slower affair than today, especially, where suitable roads were few (and they certainly were fewer than today) and on the oceans, while air travel was on the hot-air balloon level. Those “[bombs/missiles/drones]” did not exist at all. (Well, at least not in the senses implied in the reporting on the Iran attacks.) Etc. Warfare certainly did arise in very short order on occasion, but not in an even remotely modern manner and not over the distances possible today—including that wars “then” often involved moving troops across a border and pushing onwards, in the hope of reaching the enemy capital with sufficiently little resistance, while wars “now” can see that capital bombed at the very beginning of a war.

Thirdly, in the modern world, there is greater vagueness (and/or vagueness of interpretation) about what constitutes a war and what something else. Consider a situation where U.S. forces attack and destroy “[bombs/missiles/drones]” headed from Iran to Israel but do not attack any Iranian personnel, assets, or whatnot beyond those “[bombs/missiles/drones]”. What is the nature of this action and what is the resulting state of the countries involved relative each other? How does the situation change as a response might escalate, e.g. by shooting down Iranian planes over, respectively, Israeli territory, neutral territory, and Iranian territory, by attacking a missile silo on Iranian territory, by whatnot? Or consider a cyber attack from a foreign country. Or consider state sponsored terrorism. Etc.

Fourthly, declaring war and being in a state of war have long been two different things, if in doubt because a declaration or attack from another country typically forces matters, regardless of whether the other party counters with a declaration of war of its own. This the more so in the modern world and looking at the above; this the more so when we consider various “in between” states. In the case of the Iranian regime, e.g., there is no doubt that it has been deeply hostile towards the U.S. for a very long time and little doubt that the main reason that it has not attacked the U.S. mainland is some mixture of a lack of ability and a fear of retaliation—and more reachable targets have been attacked in the past. What level and type of attack, then, should be considered an act of war and what something else? How does the earlier Iranian proxy-war against Israel compare to a traditional war? Etc.

In a manner of speaking, a declaration of war today is like person A demanding satisfaction from person B after person B jumped him and while they are already fighting a deadly battle. (While it might have been the demand for satisfaction that brought about the fight in the days of yore.)

A more interesting idea relates to a declaration of a “state of war” (not necessarily by that name), in the sense that Congress can determine that a certain war or warlike situation has reached a point where greater societal restrictions, rearrangements, whatnot are necessary than for a lesser conflict. This might then have an effect on means of financing and size of a “war budget”, on where, when, and whether martial law can be invoked, whether troops can be raised beyond some peacetime limit and by what means (e.g. extensive reserve mobilization, e.g. a draft), and similar. It would, however, not initiate a war, nor be a prerequisite for armed actions.

Death of Khamenei, tying entries together, etc. (2026-03-01)

With the predecessor page having reached a sufficient size to make a switch urgent, the combination of the death of Khamenei and the change of month makes for a good opportunity: Not only did the predecessor page, then, both begin and end with a bang (capture of Maduro resp. attacks on Iran), but the new page also can begin with a bang and a parallel to the beginning of its predecessor, the capture of one evil dictator replaced by the killing of another.

In a twist, yesterday’s death of Khamenei coincided with the 40th anniversary of the death of Olof Palme (cf. [1]), which brings me back to the topic of Schadenfreude. I do not in the slightest wish to equate Palme with Khamenei, but they are personally interesting with regard to Schadenfreude in that Palme is one of the prior cases where I have felt something in that direction (cf. [1]), while I first mentioned own Schadenfreude, just a few months ago, with regard to Khomeini, motivated by how his death had brought the strongest Schadenfreude of my own past (cf. [2]).

Not only was Khomeini Khamenei’s predecessor, but there are considerable similarities in their being evil and dictatorial Islamist leaders of Iran, resulting deeds, and whatnot, and I have long wondered exactly what would happen with regard to Schadenfreude at the eventual death of Khamenei. (The similarity in name might make me further likely to equate the two, even with the knowledge that their names are immaterial. There was a difference in type of death, but not in a manner that makes me more sympathetic towards Khamenei.)

The answer is that I did feel a bit of a high upon first reading, if tempered by the fact that the death was yet unconfirmed. While this high was both lesser and shorter than the one after the death of Khomeini, it might have been the most significant since then. (Relating specifically to someone’s death and Schadenfreude. Far greater and longer highs have followed other events, including the urgently needed election victories of Trump in 2016 and 2024.) This high passed comparatively soon, in favor of that “good riddance” feeling, together with great hopes for the future of Iran and the surrounding area. (With the death of Khamenei, my personal interest in the topic of Schadenfreude has likely been exhausted and I will drop it for the foreseeable future.)

In a bigger picture, the more narrow targeting of hostile leaders that have developed over time, and has taken a leap during the Trump era, is interesting. Note e.g. how Saddam was dethroned by a war with “boots on the ground”, while Khamenei was taken out by targeted aerial attacks, and how much faster things went with Khamenei once preparations were in place. (How much preparation had taken place is hard for me to judge, but there was certainly a long-ish build-up phase)

Whether this is a good or a bad thing, I cannot tell: On the one hand, it has advantages like lesser suffering for civilians through war, a greater chance that other leaders of nations keep from excesses or become more cooperative (in light of Maduro and Khamenei, Putin might be more open to negotiations, e.g.), and that leaders of warfaring countries have to accept a greater personal risk, instead of hiding behind their armies. On the other, we have issues like the risk that national leaders are restricted out of fear much more generally and that, say, some Islamist or far Left country starts to take out leaders for simply not being Islamist resp. far Left. (What if Khamenei had been the one with U.S. resources? Who can say what some “squad” member chooses to do if she becomes POTUS in the future?)

A potential disadvantage of another kind is that the type of trial and formal justification for death that Saddam went through is absent. (For e.g. Khamenei; Maduro, of course, was extracted for the purpose of trial.)

Whether leaving the rest of a regime in place is a good or a bad thing is also hard to tell and can vary depending on local details—note e.g. how the fall of Saddam gave rise to ISIS. With Venezuela, Trump’s decision to leave the rest of the regime might be for the best, if (which seems likely) free and fair elections follow in a reasonable time frame. With Iran, we have to see how things develop, including e.g. whether an internal uprising to remove the remainder of the regime will follow and, if so, whether this will work better or worse than the toppling of Saddam.

At a stage when the death was yet unconfirmed by Iran, I visited Wikipedia to see what was said. The main page for Khamenei^w, at the time, said nothing at all. The talk page correctly noted that reporting did not yet meet criteria for inclusion in Wikipedia as certain fact, but even mentions of “[Israel/the U.S.] says that he is dead” seemed to be ruled out, while aspersions were cast about propaganda lies—as if the reports had a Hamas-level lack of credibility. Later, after Iranian confirmation, the death was included, but now portrayed as an “assassination”, rather than e.g. a military strike. Such events show how Wikipedia has turned from something that strived to be a great encyclopedia into a tool for the Left that increasingly cannot be taken seriously, at all, and has for a long time required a great deal of critical thinking and skepticism on even tangentially political topics (note [3], linked texts, and other older texts).

Looking at international reactions, although partially with an eye at the strikes in general, it is interesting that some strongly Leftist, seemingly anti-Trump, and/or seemingly bowing-to-Islamism nations, e.g. Canada and Australia, have expressed support—there might be some hope for them, after all. (Note e.g. the cowardly reactions of Australia after the Bondi Beach massacre. Also note how Wikipedia, at my visits, despite 15 slaughtered innocents, have used words like “shooting” and “attack” instead of “massacre”—while claiming e.g., with great emphasis and from day 1, that George Floyd was murdered.)