In politics, there are quite a few words that are used in a problematic manner, e.g. because of deliberate misuse, because of genuine ignorance of meaning, because meanings have drifted too much over time and geography, because different users have a radically different understanding of a word—consider how “fairness” is something that virtually everyone supports but how different the implications of the word can be to any given speaker/hearer.
The list of such words is long, and I will only deal with some here and in due time. (Some of the most noteworthy among the many other examples are “discrimination”, “equality”, “offensive”, and “racism”. TODO import and link to Wordpress texts)
The chronologically first entry, on “divisive”, arose as an entry on a various page, and was followed there by “martyr” (however, “martyr” is only given an excursion here, as it is not a sufficiently wide-spread issue). Once I wanted to add an entry for “tone deaf”, I decided to create a dedicated page for such problematic words.
Note that this page tries to deal with words, uses, and abuses that are mostly particular to politics. It does not usually include more general cases of bureaucracy/corporate/PR/whatnot speak (e.g. “reach out” over “contact”)—such cases do occur often in the world of politics, but they are not in the slightest particular to politics. Ditto more general language issues (e.g. abuse of “they”; some of my extensive writings on such topics are found in another category).
The defining characteristic of a conspiracy theory is that it involves a conspiracy. In politics and/or Leftist propaganda, it usually seems to be used with a strongly deviating meaning, namely, of something that is manifestly wrong, pseudo-scientific, or otherwise to be ignored—often, with the implication that whoever believes in the alleged conspiracy theory is not just wrong but an outright crackpot. To boot, proof of wrongness (etc.) is virtually never given, leaving a main use as a rhetorical cudgel to discredit opponents without having to engage them with actual arguments.
Consider the idea that Caesar was murdered by a group of conspiring senators/rivals/whatnots. This is a conspiracy theory—it is also widely considered to be a historical truth. In reverse, the idea that Caesar was murdered by a lone gunman is not a conspiracy theory—but the suggestion is in crackpot territory. (Every other complication aside, there are no indications of guns in the Roman empire. Bows and arrows, scorpios, and other older technologies, yes; actual guns, no.) However, if we affix a “and the CIA covered it up!” to the Caesarian lone gunman, we again have a conspiracy theory—and, this time, we are simultaneously in crackpot territory.
The phrase “conspiracy theory”, it self, has a conspiracy theory that well illustrates the principle: I have heard claimed that it was invented by the CIA exactly for purposes like manipulating the broad masses into discounting various unpopular-with-the-CIA hypotheses. This alone makes it a conspiracy theory—whether the claim is correct, which I have never investigated, is beside the point.
It might be argued that whoever coins a phrase should have the say in what the phrase means, which, if the claim is true, would give the CIA that say and make the misuse of the phrase more legitimate.
Here, this fails on at least three issues:
The idea hinges on the combination of phrase and meaning being sufficiently reasonable. The misuse does not constitute a reasonable combination, however. By analogy, the combination “horse-drawn vehicle” and automobile car is unreasonable, while “automobile car” and automobile car is reasonable; and the combination of “horse-drawn vehicle” and something that is both a vehicle and horse-drawn is reasonable. (Here, I speak of these phrases as somewhat generally and permanently applying terms. It is, of course, possible to have some specific automobile car with an engine failure temporarily drawn by a horse.)
Overlapping, the “natural” meaning of the phrase is so clear and obvious that it is likely to have arisen independently on various occasions and uses even before any CIA involvement, which would invalidate the idea of coiner, as such. This, especially, when allowing for natural variations, say, the usually more accurate “conspiracy hypothesis”. (I stick with “conspiracy theory” for consistency with typical use.)
Even if a coiner is given a say, that say is beside the point if not taken—and, to the best of my knowledge, the CIA has never made the claim that “we coined this phrase and this is what it means”. (Be it because the CIA did not coin it or does not wish to admit to the coining.)
A particular twist is how the COVID-countermeasure era saw a number of claimed conspiracy theories turn out to be either true or, later, taken seriously by sufficiently many sufficiently qualified observers that implications like “if you believe X, you are a crackpot” turned absurd. A good example is the lab-leak hypothesis, which was widely derided as a “conspiracy theory” (mostly, if not necessarily entirely, in the “crackpot sense”). Not only has subsequent evidence made the lab-leak hypothesis look plausible (the U.S. House report views it as outright probable), but there is now proof of deliberate attempts by Fauci et al. to cover up and discredit it in a manner that amounts to a conspiracy. At a minimum, they conspired to prevent free and fair debate and serious investigations of the possibility; quite possibly, they conspired to cover up incriminating facts while themselves seeing the lab-leak hypothesis as plausible.
The trigger for this entry, however, was an example that borders on the apolitical and shows how widely spread and ingrained the misuse has become due to its frequency in political contexts: Wikipedia on the Tartarian Empirew (in case of changes, refer to oldid=1260924674) alternately describes various ideas around this Tartarian Empire as “pseudo-history” (likely, justified) and “conspiracy theor[y/ies]” (unjustified), e.g. that it was something like an Atlantis-of-Tartary. In this, there seems to be no understanding that these are radically different terms with radically different implications, and that nothing (?) mentioned on the page actually falls into the category of conspiracy theories. In contrast, a claim like “evidence of the Tartarian Empire is suppressed by the government” would be a conspiracy theory. (Such claims might well exist, but are not the target of Wikipedia’s use.)
Whether this example is more political or apolitical depends on factors that I cannot judge from the page alone. Taken alone, the ideas seem to be the kind of pseudo-science/-history that is not (or not automatically/necessarily) political. The works/ideas of Erich von Däniken, e.g., are not typically viewed as political, while moving on a similar level of wrongness and in a similar topic area. The complication is that the page puts them in the context of “Russian nationalism”, which adds a political angle. We now have questions like what aspects dominate, what purposes the believers might follow, to what degree believers are “true believers” resp. merely claim belief, and to what degree the nationalism at hand is of a political nature—questions that I cannot judge without further readings/research.
As an aside, I caution that even the classification as pseudo-science/-history, other phrases often misused, hinges on methods and mindset—not correctness. It is not enough to just be wrong, there must also be an element of so poor use of methods and/or so wrong a mindset that the (unqualified) word “science” is undeserved, while there is a simultaneous pretension of science. Indeed, even pseudo-science might occasionally get something right—by sheer coincidence, if nothing else. It is then possible, if rare, to be correct and still deserve the label “pseudo-science”. (Going by the Wikipedia page, however, it is likely that both “wrong” and “pseudo-science” apply in this specific case.)
An interesting question is whether some group might be deliberately pushing “conspiracy theory” into contexts like the Tartarian Empire in order to strengthen the (unjustified and misleading) association between conspiracy theories and e.g. pseudo-science, with an ultimate goal of making the label “conspiracy theory” the more effective as a rhetorical/propaganda trick.
(Here, I prefer Hanlon’s Razor, but it would fit well with the methods used by some propagandists.)
In U.S. politics, great store seems to be put on bills (initiatives, whatnots) that are “bipartisan”, in the sense that support comes from both major parties.
In reality, however, I have seen repeated cases where the Democrats praise a bill a “bipartisan” because it has the support of a small minority of the Republicans—which entirely misses the point of true bipartisanship. (Ditto some similar settings, as when a bill might be suggested or developed in committee by a Democrat and RINO.) Equally, I have heard complaints that the Republicans (or some specific Republican, e.g. a vetoing governor) would go against a “bipartisan” bill, with the implication that this would be more-or-less a moral wrong. But, if the Republicans went against it, how bipartisan could it truly have been?
At a minimum, the word should be limited to cases with significant (preferably, majority) support in both parties.
In a bigger picture, however, concerns can be raised against the idea of something being “bipartisan” on at least two counts:
Firstly, in the best of worlds everything would be judged on its merits. The issue of something being “partisan”, “bipartisan”, or whatnot would never matter—either it is beneficial or it is not.
Secondly, the intended implication that something “bipartisan” would be better is highly dubious, as it can equally be a sign that the politicians collaborate (e.g. by trading support for the one bill and the one party against support for another bill by the other party) against the interest of the people or, absent actual collaboration, have shared priorities that deviate from those of the people. (And, from the point of view of a member of the people, we land at the previous paragraph: he should not consider a bill good because the politicians claim that it is “bipartisan” but if and when it actually makes sense to him.) In this, it can be an outright positive when a bill causes heated debate—that way, the chance is increased that the voters’ support is not abused or wasted. (With secondary advantages including that a bill that was subjected to heated debate, controversy, whatnot, is more likely to have been thought through in sufficient detail.)
For examples of how not to do it, consider Germany since the beginning of the Merkel era, where the will of the voters has repeatedly been made redundant through anti-democratic, unethical, and destructive coalition governments between parties that should be sworn enemies. (This is made the worse, as the coalitions have usually artificially favored the Left: Either the Left has a majority and we see a Leftist government, or the non-Left has a majority and the nominally Conservative CDU forms a coalition with the Social-Democrats, ensuring that the Left is at least partially in power.)
That a bill is both genuinely bipartisan and in the best interest of the people does happen. If so, the label “bipartisan” might, for all I care, by attached, but would be of significance only rarely, as such a bill is likely to pass without great fuss and publicity anyway.
Special cases include e.g. a “bipartisan committee”, with the idea that a committee is set up for some purpose and has roughly 50–50 members. (But, analogous to the above, a Democrat committee with a few token Republicans is not bipartisan in a meaningful way—and vice versa.) Here, however, the word “bipartisan” has a somewhat different meaning and it is not a given that suggestions made by the committee will eventually have “bipartisan support”.
To be tone deaf, in its literal sense, is a matter of a musical lack, an inability to interpret tones correctly. (Sometimes sloppily extended to refer to other or more general musical issues, up to and including an inability to sing/play in an adequate manner, regardless of reason.)
To apply “tone deaf” to politics, at all, is likely a bad idea, but if it is applied, then the application should match some metaphorical tone deafness, as when someone sees some politically relevant facts and fails to draw the right conclusion. (By which token a great many politicians would be tone deaf...)
In reality, the implication tends to be “someone said something and I/we disapprove of it” (with variations like “[...] found it insulting”). For instance, the trigger for writing this entry was the claim:
A parade of New Zealand academics are lining up either to denounce him as tone-deaf or sneer that he might have received too many bangs to the head.
This, after someone (Joe Marler) criticized the “haka”, a ritual Maori dance, in the context of sports—where a strong case can be made that it has no place. (Depending on the exact performance and context, I might consider it: unsporting, as it often has an element of intimidation; a waste of the time of others, including opposing team and audience; pointless, as it serves no legitimate purpose in the context; unprofessional or, even, outright childish, as adult and elite athletes should focus on the sport at hand.)
Now, if Marler had spoken in the belief that “a parade of New Zealand academics”, various haka fans, or various haka performers would line up to lend their support, then, just maybe, the use of “tone deaf” could be justified. (But even this feels like a stretch.) There is no reason to believe that this is the case, however. More likely, he saw something as problematic and decided to speak up about the problem. To take even the expectation that others would disagree as a reason not to speak, would reduce the chance of a change, bring a greater risk of creating or preserving “echo chambers” and “opinion corridors” on the topic, etc.
The simple truth is that we cannot and must not let the risk of a negative reaction prevent us from speaking up, be it to point to a problem, to contradict some narrative, to point out errors in reasoning or the existence of other perspectives, etc. (Exception: If the negative reaction is so extreme that it causes danger, caution might force an exception. This, however, shows a problem with the reaction—not with the speaker.)
In as far as someone errs in another regard, e.g. through failing to be diplomatic when diplomacy is legitimately called for, a formulation should be chosen that reflects the actual error at hand, e.g. “lacking in diplomacy”. Pushing a spurious “tone deaf” has no justification in such cases.
While I have not kept a list of examples, I have the strong impression that the abuse of “tone deaf” (as with many other words) is a predominantly Leftist issue, especially, as one of the many rhetorical tricks used to to condemn someone without actually addressing his arguments, or, rather, to condemn someone for the purpose of not having to address his arguments.
A particular point is that the Left and/or women often fall into the trap of considering whoever is the angriest, the loudest, or similar, to be in the right. However, the connection between being angry/loud/whatnot and being right is extremely weak. (Indeed, the Left appears to be angry and/or loud more often than right.) To, then, speak up against someone angry and in the wrong is not a matter of tone deafness—but of doing the right thing.
When it comes to private situations, some caution might be needed, e.g. in that we do not try to explain to someone angry why he is in the wrong until he has had a chance to calm down. (And even then some cases might better be left alone out of diplomacy.) Even here, however, the application of “tone deaf” is limited. (It might e.g. apply when person A fails to understand that person B is angry, but not when he explains in the full knowledge of the anger.)
When a situation is public, however, this changes.
A discussion of demands that someone “read the room” might (barring the portions on literal tone deafness) read very similarly.
Quite a few other words, notably “insensitive”, share lesser similarities: Yes, if someone says something in ignorance of the effect that it can have on the counterpart this will often (not necessarily always) be insensitive. However, if the statement is made because it really should be said and because it would be wrong to allow any “sensitivity” of the counterpart’s to stand in the way of the saying, the label does not apply.
This the more so, as large groups (especially, in Leftist areas) are over-sensitive or, worse, feign sensitivity (feign being insulted, upset, whatnot) in order to limit their opponents.
The word “divisive” is very problematic in today’s politics, because it creates an impression of an active attempt, while the intent of the users of the word is usually either on something passively and indirectly happening or some combination of a cheap rhetorical trick and the sentiment that “we do not like him; ergo, he is divisive”. The former is potentially exemplified by some recent [September 2024] reports on the death of Alberto Fujimori, which were the trigger for this text; the latter by countless mentions of Donald Trump.
(Where I speak of “potentially” because borders can be hard to draw, Trump, to some degree, is deliberately provocative, and my knowledge of Fujimori is limited. The latter was highly problematic in some regards, that I do know, but whether he was divisive is another matter entirely. However, his exact status is irrelevant to the big picture of this text.)
A better use of the word is for someone who deliberately tries to push various individuals, groups, peoples, whatnot apart and to create problems between them, in what might amount to “sowing discord”. Vice versa, most of those to whom the word currently seems to applied, would be better referred to as e.g. “controversial”, which describes them as having a (potentially) passive characteristic.
Other common uses include a “divisive” policy, which is problematic already because a policy, as such, has no intent or will and does not try to do something. Even ignoring this problem, the same as above usually applies—they might cause controversy, but they are not thereby divisive. Ditto various other uses (not necessarily restricted to politics), as with a “divisive building”, “divisive decision”, or, even, “divisive athlete”—chances are that these are merely controversial and not actually divisive.
Looking at U.S. politics, and what various politicians themselves say and do (as opposed to what their opponents claim that they say and do), actual divisiveness seems far more common among Democrats (while the label is, paradoxically, usually applied to Republicans). Which party tries to saw discord between Blacks and Whites to further its own causes? Democrats. Between women and men? Democrats. Between homo- and heterosexuals? Democrats. Etc. Likewise, historically and worldwide, it was predominantly the Left, especially Marxists, that pushed groups apart, furthered hate between groups, etc.
Note that the gap between (a) what someone actually says and does, and (b) what (especially, Leftist) opponents claim that he says and does, is often quite large. When establishing e.g. what type of policies someone is likely to push when in office, look at actual past actions first, then own claims, and only after that consider the claims of opponents.
Concerning divisive Democrats, beware that the intent in any individual case must be considered. Much of what the Democrats do in related areas is ill-advised, harmful, whatnot, but might also be made with good and non-divisive intentions. The above refers to actually divisive actions and intentions.
The Republicans, in contrast, might well point to problems with e.g. some groups of immigrants, but they do so because there actually are problems with these groups—and a message like “immigrants are evil”, even in a more diplomatic or softened form, is an extraordinarily rare exception. (While e.g. a “Whites are evil” is far more common among Democrats or, at least, some important sub-groups of the Democrats.) Indeed, most Republicans do not seem to primarily blame even the problematic immigrants (as such; excepting outright criminals, MS-13, and whatnot) but immigration policy, and are careful to separate legal and illegal immigrants in their treatments. (In a next step, a divisive Democrat often tries to sow discord by claiming that someone critical of immigration policy is racist, xenophobic, or similar—but that is a different story.)
While too specific to make a general entry:
A repeated annoyance in the war between Israel and various terrorist groups is the abuse of the word “martyr”. (Mostly, but not exclusively, by the latter.) An example of a martyr is someone who sticks to a particular religious position even when faced with death as a consequence. A random civilian who is accidentally hit by a bullet intended for someone else is not a martyr. Such an event is a tragedy and words like “victim” might apply—but not “martyr”. Likewise, a soldier killed while fighting other soldiers will not normally be a martyr—just a casualty. Even someone strongly religious who is killed by accident by an enemy is not a martyr (even should the war have a religious aspect). Etc.
I do not attempt to draw exact borders, e.g. whether the position has to be religious or whether it might also be political/ideological and whether outright death (as opposed to, say, permanent disfigurement) is necessary. The above cases, however, are clear.
An interesting question is when the above “normally” is exceeded for a soldier. It might e.g. be that someone who engages in a suicide mission can deserve a “martyr”. (But note the difference between a legitimate military suicide mission, say, to take out an important military target, and a terrorist suicide bombing, aimed at killing innocent civilians.)
The self-chosen labels “pro-life” and “pro-choice”, and their derivatives, show at least three problems of a different character than the examples in the main text:
Firstly, they are too similar in appearance, making it easy to use (hear) the one and intend (understand) the other. Indeed, the trigger for this excursion is the discovery of an own mistake of this type—I put “pro-choice” where I had intended “pro-life”.
Secondly (and more importantly), they are too detached from the core of their meanings:
The lesser evil is “pro-life”, as the pro-lifers almost invariably are motivated by exactly a wish for (human) life, the belief that it is (literally or metaphorically) holy, etc., and as this attitude is usually held through a wide set of opinions in different settings, e.g. a pacifist attitude to military conflicts. Even here, however, the core implication is limited to such a small scope that the term is over-broad—and it is certainly possible, if likely rare, to combine strongly negative feelings on abortion with positive feelings on military interventionism or the death penalty.
For “pro-choice”, however, little excuse can be found. Firstly, the abortion issue has little to do with choice, and what the pro-choicers want is usually something radically different, namely to give women a one-sided right. This while excluding choice and influence by others, including both the father and the foetus. Moreover, a “pro-choice” in other areas is often absent. For instance, very many pro-choicers are in favor of mandatory health insurance schemes and, more generally, a loss of choice for the individual in favor of “nanny government”. The term is so misleading that I, were I to hear it for the first time without knowing the background, might have taken it to imply something in the Libertarian and/or non-nanny government direction—but these are manifestly not opinions that dominate among pro-lifers.
Yes, we can discuss whether a foetus should have a choice in the matter. (Possibly, substituting the likely will of the adult that it, sans abortion, might have grown into.)
That, however, is a portion of the issue that actually should be discussed, and which the pro-lifers almost invariably refuse to discuss: When on the road from conception to adulthood do we acquire the status of human beings, when are we awarded human rights, etc. Many Christians, e.g., see the conception as the “when”; historically, “quickening” and “viability” have been common choices. A pro-choicer who is actually serious about the issue should pick a “when” based on rational criteria and then argue based on those criteria. Instead, we get such nonsense as “my body, my choice”, which utterly misses the point—up to and including that it is actually the body of the foetus that is at stake.
Thirdly, they are very vague in their meanings, because of the complications of “when” in the above side-note. At an extreme, we might have two persons who both see abortion as acceptable up to point X (but not beyond), where the one identifies as “pro-life”, because he sees human life as beginning at X, and the other as “pro-choice”, because X might give women a great degree of latitude for “elective” abortions. (Similar complications include a loss of nuance, e.g. concerning attitude towards abortion in case of rape and medical emergencies. Indeed, a common issue is that pro-lifers are misrepresented as uniformly having an “absolutely no abortions under any circumstances” attitude, which actually appears to apply to only a small minority.)
The word “predictable” is an interesting illustration of another problem family: the word, it self, is usually understood and used sufficiently uniformly, but I have seen quite a few Leftist uses where it is abused for a particular line of misleading rhetoric. (Specifically, one of the lines that aim at avoiding an actual discussion of the underlying topic. See side-note for another example.)
For instance, some while back, I read a complaint over (very legitimate) protests against one of BBC’s many woke casting disasters, where a great number of characters had been cast with various minorities in an anachronistic manner and/or one that was contrary to an underlying book. (Which work this might have been, I do not remember—the number of works afflicted is simply too large.) The more-or-less only “argument” in this complaint? The protesters would be “predictable”. The apparent implication? Because the protesters were “predictable”, the protesters had no case.
The point here is not whether such woke casting is justified but the unwillingness to actually provide arguments that go beyond cheap rhetoric and sloganeering.
Looking at the underlying issue, however, I would not necessarily object if individual anachronistic casting choices were made for a good reason, e.g. because some Black actor impressed the most among the actors interested in the part and the choice was not ridiculously contrafactual (say, casting Queen Victoria with a Black woman or, worse, Black man).
The problem here is that the woke casting takes place on a massive scale, for political or ideological reasons, and with no regard for the resulting quality (even e.g. anachronistic choices aside). Acting ability matters, as do fitness for the role at hand, and by pushing e.g. a must-be-Black casting, the pool of candidates is shrunk to the point that the work suffers relative a better casting.
Additional arguments can be raised concerning how an incorrect worldview can be created among viewers. This is generally a problem with fiction, but the results in other areas are rarely very dire. With woke castings, however, we might have results like viewers assuming a different presence of non-Whites in the past, which leads to wrong conclusions about history or the now. At an extreme, some survey in the U.S. showed that many thought that around half (!) the population was Black—in part, because of on-screen over-representation of Blacks. In a next step, this can give ammunition to distorting rhetoric about alleged “under-representation”, “discrimination”, and similar.
Yet another angle is fairness: Being an actor, outside a highly successful (numeric) minority, is hard enough. Now imagine that talent and hard work takes second place to skin color—on top of all the other obstacles.
Then we have issues like faithfulness to an original work and respect for its author, and similar complications—the lack of which is a problem ranging well beyond matters of woke casting.
But what should be done instead?!? Should we not protest against the recurrence of a problem because we have protested against it before?!? There might come a time when protests cease, true, because no-one can be bothered to protest for the umpteenth time against a problem that lives on despite the umpteen-minus-one earlier protests. That, however, does not make the protest less justified, nor is it a sign that the problem has gone away. It is certainly not a justification of whatever Leftist nonsense was behind the problem or an acknowledgment that the problem never was a problem.
Likewise, if someone walks up and down the street and, without provocation, punches random others in the nose, it is perfectly predictable (and entirely justified!) that he sees violence returned. No, not everyone will return it, but enough will, maybe including many who might only have witnessed an unprovoked punch. That the reaction/consequence is predictable does not make it any less justified. Similarly, he has no right to demand a release from police custody, merely because the custody was predictable.
Or turn the matter around: What, e.g., if someone were to reject woke casting by the BBC because it is predictable? (And predictable it is.) Or what if the many, many repeated Leftist protests on various topics were rejected because they were predictable? (Indeed, the Left can to some degree be seen as a meta-movement of systematic, and usually unfounded, protests against anything between heaven and earth.)
Another example of similar “argumentation” is to simply use some variation of “the same old tired argument—again!”. (Something that I have seen quite often with Feminists.) Well, the argument might be old, but it is not therefore tired. More importantly, to those who bother to check facts and think matters through, it might actually be devastating to the Leftist position. (It often is, which might be why the Left wants to avoid its use, but each argument must, of course, be judged on its individual merits.)
What then are we to do?!? Refrain from raising a strong argument, because it has already been used in the past? Because the Left has no good answer to it?
A particularly perfidious variation is to raise the audacious claim that this-or-that argument would have been debunked ad nauseam (and here some anti-Feminist drags it up—again!). Well, if the claim about the debunking was true, this might be a valid approach, but it never has been, in the cases where I have seen this variation. So, instead of actually giving a counter-argument, the Feminists pretend that they would have given something a thorough debunking, they refuse to present the counter-arguments because of the “again” (in reality, no counter-arguments of note exist), they fail to link to a prior debunking (in reality, none exists), etc.
There are quite a few words that should or could be used but which are not, for spurious reasons, and/or are suggested as “do not use” by those with an agenda or a lack of insight. These often come with very poor replacement suggestions. Note e.g. my discussion of “illegal immigrant” vs. the highly misleading “undocumented immigrant” on my various page.
An interesting twist is that such cases that occur outside politics often still have a more-or-less political motivation. (In some cases, to the point that it is hard to tell what is a “political” resp. “non-political” use.) Note e.g. the many PC terms that do more harm than good to language—sometimes even resulting in euphemism treadmills. For example, a housewife is not a homemaker. For example, what is the point of declaring words like “retard” to be offensive, when they (a) originally were chosen to be value-neutral, (b) the replacement will be seen as offensive by the same complainers a few years down the line, (c) this repeats again and again?
A particularly interesting case is “Indian” (red, not dot):
Firstly: A legitimate reason to avoid “Indian” would be disambiguation, exactly to avoid the red-or-dot confusion. However, those who oppose the use seem to invariably go for “Offensive!!!”, which simply is nonsense. (Note how the alleged reason for a suggested change can tell us much about the underlying motivations of the suggester.)
Secondly, the main suggested alternative “native American” is idiotic and even worse misleading than “Indian”. Donald Trump is a native American, just like I am a native Swede. The obvious choice would have been “aboriginal American”. Indeed, this choice is so obvious that I strongly suspect a truly abusive motivation behind “native American”, namely, to codify superior rights to the land in the very language used. (But I have not investigated the history of the term.)
A secondary, but off-topic, problem is how the use of “American” for “U.S.” complicates matters—the more so as the Canadians have chosen a different way to handle “Indian” and as great classification problems can arise when we look at, say, Peru and Alaska.
(The Canadian “First Nations” is an extremely awkward term, but is not as problematic as “native American”.)
The ambiguity of “Indian” does not exist in e.g. Swedish and German, where words for “red” and “dot” Indians are used that do show the common etymology but differ in shape. For instance, Swedish uses “Indier” for “dot” and “Indian” for “red”. (The reason is likely that the latter was imported in approximately the English shape from the U.S. at a comparatively late stage, while the former had taken a different road at a much earlier stage.)
In particular when the political and the everyday overlap, there can be a great many tricky judgment calls and problems with drawing borders.
Consider the odd rejection of the word “secretary” as (pseudo-)offensive (“I am not a secretary!!! I am an executive assistant!!!”). This rejection is not only highly irrational (cf. below), but also seems extremely overblown, almost religious, and otherwise odd. In its superficial signs, it would then match many uses pushed by the Left for ideological/political reasons (and a Feminist angle can certainly not be ruled out). However, at the same time, some mixture of stupidity, ignorance, and irrationality would probably suffice to explain this idiocy—and there is no obvious political angle to it.
A sufficient mechanism might e.g. be that some women see how some secretaries performed comparatively low-level tasks (say, taking dictation), that these were usually women working for men, and/or that they had the impression that the profession was female dominated (and, therefore, for some reason, to be viewed negatively). In this, it is somewhat similar to how a word like “retard” has gone from being medical terminology to being viewed as “offensive” in the eyes of more metaphorical retards: the actual meaning and intent of the word is drowned out by the connotations that the word, in due time, developed in the minds of some. A big difference, however, is that “retard” ultimately does refer to something negative (which is how it came to moonlight as a slur), while “secretary”, to non-ignorants, can be a quite positive term.
Positive? Until somewhat recently, being a secretary in the “assistant” sense was often a position of responsibility and confidence. Indeed, etymologically, “secretary” amounts to someone trusted with secrets, while “assistant” amounts to a more generic helper or even someone who is merely present—a potentially far lesser position. Throwing a wider net, Cabinet level positions in some countries are labeled as “secretary” (and this today—not a hundred years ago), the head of the UN is the “secretary general”, etc.
In a comparison between e.g. the erstwhile secretary of an executive and an executive assistant, it is less a matter of the latter carrying more responsibility or being put in charge of tasks that the other was not and more of a modern prejudice about what the former used to do. (Beyond, of course, changes brought on by changing circumstances as time has passed, including technological developments. These, however, are independent of the label used.)
I am uncertain why and how the switch from “secretary” to variations of “assistant” began. It might have been rooted in the increasing presence of women in the workplace (initially, often in comparatively low-level positions, involving tasks like stenography/dictation/typing), which filled many positions labeled “secretary” with women and with this being the career high of many. (And, no, a girl in the typist pool was no more a secretary than a valet is a butler.) At this point, the aforementioned irrational complainers might have begun to see “secretary” as something negative and clamored for a different title, which lead to the change, which increased the irrational feeling of offense when someone spoke of a secretary, etc. (Here, it is also hard to draw the line between the cause and the symptom.)
It might also, however and e.g., have been a case of corporate newspeak, where ever newer and fancier titles and whatnots are invented for no good reason. (Note e.g. that even “executive” is a comparatively new term in this context.)
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