This page began as an entry on my then various and sundry page ([1]). As work progressed, I found it impracticably long for that page and moved it to this, separate, page.
I have attempted to find and fix any references that might need [1] or the time of writing (2026-01-14 to -15) as context, but cannot guarantee that all instances were caught.
As my original intent was on a much shorter text, I did not prepare sufficiently and ended up with a poor and inconsistent structure. For reasons of time, I will not attempt to fix this for the time being.
A number of older texts deal with similar topics, including [2], repeatedly referenced below. At least [2] can be further necessary for an understanding of my position(s). (Giving a complete list of texts might be pointless—the more so as future texts are likely to be added; however, also see some below links.)
I use “trans athlete” to avoid complications like the difference often-but-inconsistently made between transsexuals and -genders. Note that the term “trans athlete” is not strictly limited to “men-who-want-to-be-women” but also includes “women-who-want-to-be-men”. In the context of current debates and cases before the SCOTUS, the former is sufficiently much more common that it will often by my implication, but chances are that the full or almost the full meaning will also apply in a typical use. For instance, a claim that trans athletes might be rejected from a woman’s team can include many women-who-want-to-be-men, e.g. because they have taken hormone treatments to become more masculine.
The expressions “men-who-want-to-be-women” and “women-who-want-to-be-men” will also be used in the continuation, allowing considerable over-simplification as a price for convenience. Such over-simplification includes, but need not be limited to, the difference between “want” and “belief”, the possibility of cheaters who make a dishonest claim for the purpose of facing easier competition, and the possibility that those at different stages of transition might warrant different treatment, be it in terminology or in the below discussion. (Note the wide range from those who have gone through no physical steps of transition, but do identify as the opposite of what they are, to those who have a complete set of procedures and treatments.)
Proof-reading, I considered switching to formulations like “X-who-identify-as-Y”, as they might reflect the internal state of the persons referenced better (after adjusting for the above comments on over-simplification). I decided against this change because (a) current use is likely more compatible with my use in other texts, (b) the phrasing with “identify” could be seen as condoning a reality-defying mentality in a manner that I do not. (Note e.g. later remarks on “identifying” as having a contrafactual age or weight.)
For simplicity and consistency with a boxing example (cf. below), I will use “class[es]” to refer to any division of a potential field of athletes somewhat similar to weight classes in its limitations on participants, including for a separation into men vs. women.
This text was prompted by reporting on some SCOTUS cases shortly before and during the time of writing (2026-01-14 to -15), but deals with a more general perspective, with no analysis of the specific cases at hand and without necessarily claiming to be immediately relevant to them. For that matter, there is not necessarily a specific tie even to the U.S., considerable use of U.S.-centric examples notwithstanding, and some ideas of principle generalize to other contexts that e.g. trans athletes in sports. (Questions around when judges and lawmakers should resp. should not meddle, in particular, can have a bearing far outside this matter.)
This text should also not be seen as a deeper analysis of “Title IX”, which is mentioned repeatedly to exemplify principles and/or to serve as something of a placeholder, or as an attempt to discuss the matter of sex vs. “gender”.
I had intended to give a link on the issue of sex vs. “gender”, but I can find no unified treatment, as opposed to a bit here and a bit there, in my existing writings. Such a unified treatment might or might not follow (or be found...) later. For examples of such “bits”, consider parts of (in order of writing) [3], [4], and [5].
That said, the brunt of my previous readings, current interests and controversies, and the trickiness of making a truly generic discussion, has given this text a U.S.-centric take in large portions.
Apparently, the SCOTUS is currently reviewing cases of trans athletes in sports (or, more accurately, regulations thereof). Most of my own writing has had an implicit aspect of what-the-law-should-be (e.g. in [2]; sometimes literally, sometimes more metaphorically). Courts, however, should deal with what-the-law-is (notwithstanding that many Leftist judges ignore this in favor of imposing their own wishes about what the law should be—also note the continuation), taken to include matters like existing precedence and reasonable interpretation.
However, to dabble with a more judicial perspective, an interesting argument, more in the what-the-law-should-be family, is the following: Sports organizations naturally have a great (but not unlimited) latitude in how to arrange their competitions, what rules to impose, and similar. Why should specifically matters of sex and/or “gender” be different? (Temporarily putting a pin in “Title IX” and similar laws.) Looking at boxing and some other sports, a separation into weight classes is long established and a court finding that, say, someone today limited to heavyweight by his weight should be allowed to compete in welterweight, would be near unthinkable. A court finding that weight classes, as such, would, in some sense, be wrong and that everyone should compete in a single weight class might just barely be possible—but even that would cause justified outrage and ridicule. Heavyweights in the designated welterweight class? Hell no!
Arguments around latitude vs. interventions by judges, laws, executive orders, bureaucratic regulations, and similar, can go in both directions, in that e.g. an unwanted-by-the-organization imposition of trans athletes in a women’s class can come from the outside or a wanted-by-the-organization inclusion of them might be forbidden. Here, I begin with something broadly analogous to such an imposition, with a fuller picture following. (For brevity, I will mostly look at judges and laws, without seeing the general ideas as limited to those two cases.)
The issue of state vs. federal law, I will skip, for reasons of length, but I note that I see little legitimate room for state law to simultaneously trump federal laws and rules of even e.g. a state-local sports organization (when such laws respectively rules exist and are pertinent). Include sports organizations that are not state-local and the matter looks even more dubious. Under no circumstances should a state have the right re-define terms like “man” and “woman” in a manner incompatible with long established use and meaning and in a manner that potentially causes the implications to change with the crossing of a state border. (Even on the federal level, great care should be taken when it comes to matters of language.)
A complication on another level is when the effect of a law, as with Title IX, is tied to money received, or some other benefit, and someone might be forced to choose between forgoing federal money and state money, which could be an unconscionable situation or lead to the buying of the “right” behavior by the highest bidder, where the bidders all use tax-payers’ money. (Incidentally, such issues are a strong argument for limiting governmental financing of e.g. colleges.)
With weight classes, there are again two separate issues to consider, namely, (a) whether, when, and what classes are reasonable and (b) what say external parties should have in the matter. For my part, I would see fewer weight classes in boxing as a good thing—maybe, even a return to the ancient days of light-/middle-/heavyweight. Barring some law that might supersede the rules of some sports organization, however, it would border on the absurd for judges to intervene. If such a law exists, on the other hand, serious questions might need to be raised about what the legislators are up to.
Interference by judges and/or legislators would not only be an unwarranted meddling in this case, but also break with longstanding traditions and accepted behavior in an absurd manner, would cause great complications when boxers from the one country compete against those of another or an international championship required by rules to use weight classes is held in a country with a ban on weight classes, and possibly other complications to boot.
There is actually a potential exception to this, where I could see some sufficiently loony-Lefty judge attack weight classes—namely, if someone were to make an argument in the extended family of “Body shaming!”-this and “Fat shaming!”-that. (One could e.g. imagine some female heavyweight argue that she happens to carry some considerable amount of fat and that she would be a welterweight had it not been for the fat or that being unable to compete at welterweight would “fat shame” her, or similar.) Such a judgment, however, might give even the likes of Sotomayor pause and would otherwise be almost universally rejected. (Note that a single loony-Lefty judge is enough but that a large number of loony-Lefty legislators would be needed to achieve the same by legislation.)
Even so, it gives some clue as to why trans athletes (and e.g. trans bathroom visitors) have had a surprising success in demanding special treatment, that it is a matter of wokeness and not reason, ideology and not legal argument, etc. At the same time, it can illustrate how absurd some demands are. Even as is, the weight-class example is truly absurd—but what if we took it one step further and assumed a “I might be a heavyweight by the scales, but I identify as a welterweight; ergo, I should be allowed to compete as a welterweight”? Similarly, even truly loony Lefties might be reluctant to accept an argument of “I might be 25 by time passed since my birth, but I identify as 18; ergo, I should be allowed to compete in the juniors’ class”—but there is nothing absurd in this that is not worse in “I am a man, but I identify as a woman; ergo, I should be allowed to compete in the women’s class”. (And both variations are less absurd than “[...]; ergo, I am [18 resp. a woman]”.)
If discrimination of the “only those who identify as women” type is considered acceptable, why would discrimination of the “only those who are biologically women” type be considered wrong? There is no rhyme or reason in this. Looking only at trans-whatnots, an explanation might be found in an extremely self-centered and/or perspective-less attitude, e.g. on a “good for me; ergo, good” basis.
However, if we look at the Left as a whole, this is not sufficient as an explanation (notwithstanding that large portions of the Feminist Left has taken an opposing stand). Here some other explanation or combination of explanations must be found, e.g. to provide some Holy Cause around which the Faithful can gather, or to use the type of reality-denial common in brain-washing and figuring prominently in “Nineteen Eighty-Four”—for which participation in sports is, then, just a means, not an end in it self.
In the end, however, I would not rule out an underlying agenda of eradicating the notion of biological sex in favor of “gender”—possibly, with a larger end game in which the eradication of individuality, the incontestability of the outdated “nurture only” dogma, a pushing of “everything is a social construct, nothing is real, and the world is shaped by our words” magic thinking (also see the next side-note), or similar, is the true end and even the eradication of the notion of biological sex only a means. This, especially, in sub-groups of the Left that have strongly Marxist and/or Post-Modernist takes.
I almost added an alternative of “[...], but weight classes are just a social construct; ergo, [...]”. I refrained, because weight classes can actually be legitimately argued to be a social construct (depending on the exact definition used) or something of a similar nature in a more meaningful manner than can “gender” (the more so, as the imposition of “gender” over biological sex is fundamentally flawed to begin with).
However, here we see another point of interest, namely, that even something that is or approximates a social construct can have an objective value, a physical justification, or otherwise reflect something more real than just a “construct”: We might discuss whether there should be weight classes, how many there should be, where borders should be drawn, how and when weight should be measured, whether height classes might make more sense than weight classes, and similar, but it is irrefutable that, say, the typical heavyweight world champion would easily knock out even the GOAT of welterweights—as would many far lesser heavyweights. (An exception might be if the welterweight implements a tactic of avoiding getting hit at all cost and is sufficiently much faster/skilled/intelligent/whatnot to keep that up for a few rounds before a first heavyweight punch does connect or an annoyed referee decides to disqualify him.)
To “unpin” Title IX and similar laws, much might hinge on their presence. (I will speak of “Title IX” in the continuation, because individual other laws can have critical differences; however, in the main, very similar claims should apply to “and similar laws”, and that affixion can often be seen as implied after changing detailed circumstances, notably, with regard to college.) However, I have yet to see a serious interpretation that amounts to a ban of a division into a men’s and a women’s class or, on the outside, an “open” class and a women’s class. Given, then, that separate classes are implicitly viewed as compatible with Title IX, why would Title IX be viewed as having a right to modify the interpretation of such classes to e.g. change “biological women only” into “anyone who identifies as a woman”? (See below for the reverse case.) This would be contrary to the idea of both college league (note that Title IX does not affect e.g. professional sports leagues) self-determination and the motivation behind such classes (discussed in [2]). Furthermore, if we assume that Title IX would provide a “trans protection” (a historically and textually very dubious assumption), why should it further be assumed that this protection trumps the indisputably present protection of women? Even stretching assumptions to the limit in favor of trans athletes, we would merely have two different groups making similarly strong claims of protection, with women having a stronger case on other counts (notably, for reasons discussed in [2]). Without stretching assumptions, it is very hard to see trans athletes trumping female athletes with regard to Title IX.
Off-topic, it is interesting that women and/or Feminists have a long history of hypocrisy regarding classes, in that they seem to view the “other” class as “open” and not as “men’s” in a somewhat blanket manner, while viewing “their” class as strictly “women’s”. This might have had some justification in days when there only was one class and this class was men only (or, as in the case of boxing and weight classes, there were more than one class but they were all men only). In today’s world, where parallel classes for men and women are the norm, the matter stands differently and its regulation should be left to the respective federation/organizer/whatnot, e.g. in that the NBA, PGA, ATP, etc., each decide whether they run an “open” or a “men’s” class. (Ditto, m.m., women’s organizations like the WNBA, LPGA, WTA, and those that cover both sexes in potentially separate classes, like many or all of the FIxx organizations, e.g. FIFA.)
Such an asymmetry is interesting with regard to [2], however, and the more so as there is little clamor about women-who-want-to-be-men making their way onto men’s teams. The reason? In one direction (men to women), the trans athletes gain an advantage; in the other (women to men), they have a disadvantage. Women-who-want-to-be-men, then, do not try to get onto men’s teams, are not successful in doing so, and/or are not viewed as a particular threat in the (likely, very rare) case that one succeeds. (Where I use “threat” to imply someone who can have a significant effect on outcomes, e.g. as a strong goal scorer. However, the same applies for the more physical dangers often claimed around men on women’s teams, e.g. in that being hit in the head by a volleyball is, on average, less dangerous when the spike comes from a woman-who-wants-to-be-a-man than from a regular male player.)
Now, if we are consequent about self-determination, an individual college league could also chose to allow trans athletes among women. However, from a point of view of what-the-law-is, we do have Title IX, we have similar arguments around Title IX as above, and we have the near certainty that a man who does not identify as a woman would not be (resp., in the past, have been) allowed onto a women’s (competitive) team. It is also usually clear that those college leagues (ditto, individual colleges) who have admitted trans athletes onto women’s teams have done so for flawed reasons, often merely claiming that men-who-want-to-be-women are women (contrary to any reasonable and traditional interpretation) and/or in a manner that gives every impression of woke or other virtue signalling. In contrast, a legitimate case for self-determination would hinge on openly and officially re-defining the system to use new classes (e.g. “anyone who self-identifies as a man” vs. “anyone who self-identifies as a woman”) instead of or in addition to the old—not in a unilateral re-definition of words like “man” and “woman”.
Also note that an “anyone who self-identifies as a woman” class would not be the equivalent of the “open” class mentioned in the previous side-note—such an “open” class would allow all men, regardless of self-identification, among the women.
From a what-the-law-should-be perspective, I am a Title IX skeptic. Chances are that it does little good and much harm, if possibly through interpretation or application beyond the original intent, e.g. around rape allegations or the below-mentioned issues with removed sports teams. At the same time, applying a what-the-rules-should-be perspective, [2] gives strong reasons for sports, were common sense applied to decision making, to not allow trans athletes onto women’s teams and to not replace “biological women’s teams” with “identifies as a woman teams”.
From another angle, why does Title IX seem to hit the news so disproportionately often where specifically sports is concerned? Its nominal scope is far wider with regard to education than sports-in-education and sports is the, maybe, least valuable portion of what is covered. A large part of the explanation, I suspect, is that it simply does not make more than a marginal difference in terms of actual education topics (today, at least), while sports is more vulnerable to a fallacy of interest leading to disparate outcomes even given equal opportunity (men tend to be more interested in sports than women), but which then can conveniently be blamed on “discrimination”, or that commercial realities are more important where men and women in sports are concerned than in education proper, with a similar result. (For instance, whether a student is a man or a woman will not typically affect college profits from that student very much, but whether a college team plays in a male or a female league is a potentially very different story, because fan interest, ticket sales, donations from former students, whatnot, can depend on such matters, especially, because the level of performance can be much higher on the men’s side.)
Indeed, in as far as a more education-centric value can be found, it would, in the U.S. of 2025, be to combat e.g. under-representation of men—but mentions of that are dwarfed by those relating to sports. This could be a further sign that Title IX is fundamentally flawed. (Or, e.g., that there is a very great hypocrisy in its application and/or the publicity around its application.)
From an angle of “discrimination” (in the misused sense), there is another point worth making relating to discrimination (in the proper sense): There is a world of difference between a sports rule that e.g. institutes a class system based on sex or weight and one that bans someone of a certain sex or weight from participating, training, or similar, in a more blanket manner. Contrast e.g. a rule of “no men on the women’s team” with “[men/women] are not allowed to have a team at all” or “[men/women] are not allowed to use our track facilities”. (Ditto, m.m., for trans athletes.)
But even in some such cases, the details can matter greatly. There is also a world of difference between e.g. colleges that say that “we do not like women in sports; ergo, there will be no women’s team” resp. “we would love to have a women’s team, but we do not have enough money in the budget to justify it with how few women are interested”. (Leaving aside the question of whether college’s should have any major involvement in sports to begin with. I have long considered the U.S. system very odd.) Indeed, a failure to make a distinction between such cases has contributed to absurd side-effects from Title IX, including that some men’s teams have been scrapped because (a) a women’s team was not viable (at all or in addition to the men’s team), (b) Title IX got in the way of keeping a men’s team without having a women’s team.
Problems around the above, I suspect, also often go back to another failure to make proper distinctions, in that exactly many Leftists fail to see the difference between, say, a man being or not being allowed onto the women’s team and being or not being allowed access to training and/or some team. Ditto, say, a failure to see the difference between being or not being allowed to join some training group and being or not being allowed onto some competitive team associated with that training group. (Note that participation in competition is usually limited to a subset, regardless of matters like sex. Indeed, the subset can be a quite small proportion.) More generally, the realization is important that there is a difference between competitive sports and sports as exercise, sports as casual entertainment in a beach/park/school-yard setting, whatnot.
(Whether men and women should have separate training groups, whether a man might be allowed onto the women’s training group, as opposed to competitive team, and similar, can depend greatly on the circumstances.)
While I have not followed the SCOTUS proceedings in any detail, there were two questions posed that caught my eye in the journalistic reporting and might have some illustrative value. (Note that the superficiality of the reporting and risk of distortion through the reporting, including my own re-reporting, can make the below irrelevant to the actual questions/answers/debate/whatnot that took place in court. My focus is on a general illustration.)
Firstly, it was posited that girls would do better at calculus in high school and the question posed how this could or could not underlie similar reasoning to matters around sports in education and, by implication, what the consequences of that might be. A few points:
High-school calculus is not a competition and the point of school is not to compete. The point is to gain and improve various skills, knowledge and understanding of various topics, and similar. While it is easy to fall into the trap of e.g. “I had the best GPA; ergo, I won at school”, this is not a productive way of thinking and not the purpose of grades—much unlike, say, “I had the best time in the race; ergo, I won at racing”.
Grades do have a function of comparison, notably, in that prospective first employers and college admissions can gain some idea about the strengths and weaknesses of the applicants, but this is neither in the form of a competition similar to a sports event nor the single criterion used. (And the importance of that criterion sinks rapidly in employment applications as someone goes from a first to a second to a third job.)
A more important aspect of grades might be the information that it provides the student (and, to some degree, parents and other interested parties), in that he has a chance to see to what degree he has achieved what he wanted to/should have achieved, where he might need to put in work in the future, and similar. In this, grades would be similar to someone, every now and then, running a lap around the track to see whether his time meets his expectations, whether he has improved since the last attempt, whatnot. (This the more so, of course, for grades that are not reflected in the final/graduation GPA.)
Note how all these purposes are thwarted by problems like grade inflation, e.g. in that college admissions might be unable to tell a genuine “A” and an “A for effort” apart, and that a student who receives an “A” might be justified in thinking that he is doing well and need not change anything—but there are occasional tales of “A” students who do not just fall well short of the standards for an “A” when put to a real-life test, but of those who go from an “A” in high school to remedial study, in the very same subject, in college.
If, contrafactually, high-school calculus were still viewed as a competition, it would involve a single open class, and matters around who is or is not allowed into what existing class are irrelevant.
Adding a division into, say, “boys’ calculus” and “girls’ calculus” (which might have been suggested as a thought experiment), might have made sense in this contrafactual view but not in a more realistic view. Taken to its conclusion, such an idea would risk a system in which grades become near meaningless, because any group difference might be met with the institution of a new class, implying that a given grade would only be meaningful within this class. (On top of independent problems like grade inflation and teachers who see an “A for effort” as legitimate.)
I continue to use “class” in the same sense as in the rest of the text—not in the sense of “school class”.
A somewhat similar problem is already to some degree present, e.g. in that “underprivileged” students are given an easier time by some teachers or some schools, or in that grading might be made relative other students at the same school, who often share a similar demo-/socio-/whatnot-graphic. A particular issue can be when different courses are taken but result in the same grade, and the difference in courses is not obvious to most observers. (For instance, in my outsiders understanding, it appears that U.S. high-school students who are good at math might do “pre-calc” while age peers who are poor at math do statistics, as a softer option. It might then be that an “A” in the softer option is worth less than a “B” in the harder. This while a difference between groups could lead to a different distribution between softer and harder options.)
If there is a systematic difference in outcomes between two groups, what actions should or should not be taken depends on the reason for that difference. For instance, if boys and girls have a different aptitude for calculus or languages (on average), this would only rarely be cause for intervention; however, if it turns out that one type of tuition works best with one group and another type with another group, accommodation of this is very reasonable. (But should not be made blindly on e.g. a “boys vs. girls” basis, because individual variation can trump the group differences and it is better to sort students by what method works best on an individual basis—much unlike with “boys vs. girls” in competitive sports.) Likewise, there are strong signs that boys, in the current system, receive lower grades than girls relative their actual level of accomplishment, and, if so, changes to grading practices might be very valuable.
The last problem is likely to be reflected in the very premise that girls would be better at calculus, as this is traditionally a topic in which boys have done better in terms of grades, and a switch could strongly point to something being wrong in how boys are handled in school. (Something about which actual books have been written. It borders on the puzzling that the poser did not go with some area, e.g. languages, where girls are more traditionally and more reasonably viewed as having an advantage.) This the more so, as there are clear trends that boys still (in all reporting that I have seen to date) do better on standardized tests where factors like effort, compliance with the teacher, likability, etc., do not factor in. (This also points to a weakness inherent in using grades as a measure of how well someone has done, unless grading truly measures accomplishment, e.g. per standardized tests, while current grading practices seem to rely evermore on, for purposes of grading!, counterproductive ideas like “continuous assessment”, allow too much subjectivity by the teachers, etc.)
An telling example: Years ago, I was dumb-founded by a newspaper article that claimed that the math portions of the Swedish equivalent of the SAT would be increased for the specific purpose of improving the scores of girls (!) relative boys—because girls had better math grades than boys and more math would favor girls. This went contrary to both experiences with standardized testing (as opposed to grades) and what was known about boys, girls, and math from endless other experiences and investigations—which I knew but the alleged experts apparently did not. The change was implemented, the next test results came in, and, lo and behold, the boys’ (!) scores had improved relative the girls’ scores. However, when these results arrived, it was the proponents of the change who were dumb-founded, seemingly unable to comprehend what had happened...
(This example is also telling through the Feminist mentality that if girls/women do not match or exceed boys/men, something must be done—and never mind the possibility that there might be an inherent group difference involved. For that matter, never mind that, within the Swedish admissions system, the higher average school grades of girls might make a larger proportion of potentially high-scoring girls than potentially high-scoring boys forgo the test...)
In reverse, some question was posed around chess and the fact that men appeared to do much better than women. This fails to consider that the world of chess has exactly a division into an “open” class, where both men and women may participate, and a separate women’s class. (I have not looked into the motivations behind the question, but it might be that the poser of the question simply was not aware of the women’s class and assumed that only a single class existed.) Such a comparison is also vulnerable to problems like the “apex fallacy”, here, that men could be over-represented in the top echelons of chess ability (and, therefore, dominate in the top echelons of chess accomplishment), while no average difference were present. (I have not investigated how the averages do compare, as my beef is with the sloppy thinking potentially involved.)
With chess (and e.g. calculus) there is an additional risk that the poser of the question, those listening to the debate, or similar, fall(s) into the trap of thinking that all brains are equal (or equal-except-where-females-are-superior). Acknowledging that men are better at, say, swimming is not normally controversial, but doing so for chess could violate various PC taboos or be deemed untrue-because-we-do-not-want-it-to-be-true, regardless of what actual evidence might say.
In swimming the presence of timing makes it hard to deny the truth, but even moving to tennis introduces scope for reality-denying Feminists to raise cries of “Sexism!!!”. (As they did when the ability of Serena Williams to compete with the top men was, with great justification, doubted.) Something similar might have applied to chess, had chess had a men’s class instead of the open one.